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I.

INTRODUCTION

Once upon a time there was a family-run business, which sold
1
appliances. One of the family members, a minority owner in the
business, managed the company. He was at times quite belligerent.
Over time, his idea of where the family business was heading
increasingly conflicted with the ideas of the other owners. The
minority owner became an ineffective manager and started causing
the family business to lose money. Eventually the family voted to
remove him from his position as manager. Feeling slighted, he
filed suit against the family members for oppression.
Because the minority owner was a lawyer, he was able to file
multiple suits to “expedite justice.” Among these suits were claims
against the lawyers representing the family members/co-owners
who had voted the minority owner out of the business. During one
proceeding, the minority owner prevailed against the lawyers when
the court found adequate evidence to allege an aiding and abetting
breach of fiduciary duty claim against the lawyers. But the minority
owner lost on remand. The lawsuits against the lawyers and the
family members kept coming.
In the ten years following the initial lawsuit, the minority
owner sued most of the lawyers and the judges who had any
affiliation with his cases. He claimed that everyone, including the
judges who presided over his case (if he lost), was conspiring
against him. The state appeals court finally barred the minority
owner from asserting more claims against anyone related to the

1. This anecdote is based on the Kurker v. Hill series of cases. Kurker v. Hill,
689 N.E.2d 833 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (holding that minority owner’s allegations
against co-owners and lawyers supported claims of oppression and civil
conspiracy).
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subject matter. Unfortunately, his actions took a toll on a number
of different parties, including the lawyers.
This story is an example, albeit extreme, of what may happen if
a minority owner in a closely-held business cries foul and alleges
oppression. The story serves to illustrate the dangers that confront
lawyers who represent majority owners, specifically the danger of a
minority owner suing a majority owner’s lawyer for aiding and
abetting oppression.
This paper addresses a lawyer’s liability for aiding and abetting
her client’s breach of fiduciary duty owed to a co-owner. It first
gives a general overview of civil aiding and abetting law and focuses
3
primarily on the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876(b).
The next section of this paper delves further into aiding and
abetting in the context of fiduciary duties and distinguishes
between the duties owed in various contexts, including the inter-se
4
duties existent in closely-held businesses. That section is also
devoted to discussing a lawyer’s role in a client’s breach of fiduciary
duty and presents the difficulty in determining whether a lawyer
aided and abetted her client’s oppressive conduct in a closely-held
5
business. Finally, it confronts the need to create a rule that
imposes liability onto lawyers who knowingly assist oppressive
conduct but is not so over-inclusive that it holds lawyers responsible
6
when they are unaware of their clients’ oppressive conduct. This
paper concludes that there must be some procedural safeguards,
such as an expert witness, to prevent innocent lawyers from being
7
held liable for their clients’ breaches of fiduciary duty.

2. Kurker v. Kassler, No. 03-P-15, 2004 WL 556959, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct.
Mar. 22, 2004). The judge remarked:
At some point, Mr. Kurker evidently concluded that his litigation
misfortunes were the product of an ever-widening conspiracy between
the other parties to the case, their attorneys, and each judge in the
Massachusetts trial and appellate courts who had touched the case in any
way. . . . Mr. Kurker’s allegations cross[ed] the line that separates the
merely frivolous from the preposterous.
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3. See infra Part II; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979).
4. See infra Part III.A.
5. See infra Part III.B.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part V.
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II. AIDING AND ABETTING IN GENERAL
The tort of aiding and abetting developed out of the common
8
law doctrine of concerted action. Under this doctrine, a person
who acts in concert with others is liable for the unlawful acts of the
group, as well as the unlawful acts of the individual members of the
9
group. In the United States, the practice of holding persons
acting in concert jointly and severally liable for all wrongs arising
10
out of the group originated in the criminal justice system. Courts
gradually began holding persons who acted in concert in the
commission of torts jointly and severally liable for damages that the
11
third party incurred. The doctrine of concerted action is now
prevalent in civil actions and encompasses both conspiracy and
12
aiding and abetting.

8. See Pittman ex rel. Pittman v. Grayson, 149 F.3d 111, 122–23 (2d Cir. 1998)
(citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(a), (b) (1979), which states
that aiding and abetting liability is a variety of concerted-action liability); see also
Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 123 Minn. 17, 40, 142 N.W. 930, 939 (1913)
(applying the “well recognized” rule “that all who actively participate in any
manner in the commission of a tort, or who procure, command, direct, advise,
encourage, aid, or abet its commission, or who ratify it after it is done, are jointly
and severally liable therefor[e].”).
9. See Herman v. Wesgate, 464 N.Y.S.2d 315, 316 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)
(holding that passengers attending stag party were jointly and severally liable for
injuries the plaintiff sustained from being thrown off boat, even though not all
passengers directly assisted).
10. See Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618–19 (1949)
(acknowledging that where “[o]ne who aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces,
or procures the commission of an act is as responsible for that act as if he
committed it directly” is a theory firmly “engrained in the law.”); see also Pinkerton
v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646–47 (1946) (stating that “an overt act of one
partner may be the act of all.”).
11. See, e.g., Curtin v. Lataille, 527 A.2d 1130, 1132 (R.I. 1987). The plaintiff
urged the court to adopt the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) definition
of concerted action, as opposed to the criminal law definition, which requires 1)
aider and abettor to share the intent of the principal and 2) the existence of
community of unlawful purpose. Id.
12. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 190–93 (1976) (noting
the widespread recognition of aiding and abetting in securities law violations but
instead establishing defendant’s liability on direct violation of 10-b instead of
assisting another’s violation of 10-b); Failla v. City of Passaic, 146 F.3d 149, 158 (3d
Cir. 1998) (stating that rule derived from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
876(b) and used in Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 134 A.2d 761, 767 (1957),
which established “a defendant's liability for furnishing funds to a corporation
when it knew the corporate assets were being used for the personal advantage of
the president and director” has been adopted in New Jersey as the standard for
liability); Monsen v. Consol. Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1978)
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Courts reviewing claims of aiding and abetting in civil actions
turn to the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876, which sets
13
forth the elements of three distinct forms of concerted action.
Subdivision (b) provides that “for harm resulting to a third person
from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he
. . . knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and
gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to
14
conduct himself.” Although the three forms of concerted action
are differentiated according to the type of participation the person
who is accused of acting in concert has with the primary tortfeasor,
15
liability in substance is the same for all.
Liability imposed on a secondary actor who provides
substantial assistance to or encourages a primary actor in
committing a tort furthers two purposes of tort law: first, to
compensate the victim; and second, to hold responsible those who
16
give moral support to the primary tortfeasor.
“Advice or
encouragement to act operates as a moral support to a tortfeasor
and if the act encouraged is known to be tortious it has the same
effect upon the liability of the adviser as participation or physical
17
assistance.”
Although the Restatement doesn’t specifically refer to aiding
and abetting, section 876(b) sets forth the factors to which courts
turn for guidance in determining whether a secondary actor is
(reviewing aiding and abetting claim against bank for knowingly assisting 10-b
violation).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979). Although subdivision (b)
does not specifically refer to “aiding and abetting”, it guides courts in aiding and
abetting analyses. Subdivisions (a) and (c) do not come within the ambit of aiding
and abetting. One is subject to liability under subdivision (a) if she “does a
tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with him.”
Under subdivision (c), one is subject to liability if she “gives substantial assistance
to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately
considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.”
14. See id. § 876(b); Nathan Isaac Combs, Civil Aiding and Abetting Liability, 58
VAND. L. REV. 241, 251–54, 255 (2005).
15. See Herman, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 938 (stating that all who act in pursuance of
common plan to commit a tortious act, including actively taking part in it,
furthering it by cooperating or by lending or aiding encouragement to wrongdoer,
are equally liable to the plaintiff).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979).
17. Id. § 876 cmt. d (stating that liability imposed on one who gives
encouragement to another in commission of tortious act is the same as that which
is imposed upon tortfeasor). See also Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477–78
(D.C. Cir. 1983). Halberstam is a seminal case addressing multiple aspects of aiding
and abetting liability. Id.
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18

liable for the tort of aiding and abetting. In generating a test for
aiding and abetting actions, courts pull three common elements
out of subdivision (b), including: (1) a tortious act of a primary
actor; (2) the secondary actor’s knowledge of the primary actor’s
tortious act; and (3) the secondary actor’s substantial assistance or
encouragement in the primary actor’s commission of the tortious
19
act. As straightforward as this test appears, courts’ applications of
the test vary immensely. Courts generally do not have a problem
applying the first element as establishing a tortious act is required
20
to find the primary actor liable for the tort. The differences arise
primarily in each jurisdiction’s interpretation of what constitutes
21
knowledge and substantial assistance or encouragement.
A. The Knowledge Element Generally
For a secondary actor to be liable for aiding and abetting, the
secondary actor must have knowledge of the primary actor’s
22
unlawful conduct. The language of the Restatement suggests that
the secondary actor must know that the primary actor’s conduct
23
results in breaching a duty owed to a third party. The secondary
actor’s mistaken belief that the primary actor’s conduct is benign,
24
therefore, will not amount to aiding and abetting liability.
The requisite finding of knowledge depends on how a court
defines “knowledge.” The Restatement offers no assistance to
courts as it fails to define the term, and courts have difficulty

18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b).
19. See generally Combs, supra note 14, at 257–62 (comparing the differences
among courts in interpreting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) and
distinguishing between conspiracy and aiding and abetting).
20. Id. at 279–80 (stating that “[i]n most cases, duty turns upon traditional
principles, and the existence of a duty poses no substantial inquiry. If the primary
actor owes no duty to the plaintiff, then the plaintiff cannot establish an aiding
and abetting claim against the defendant.”).
21. See Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman, & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179, 186–87
(Minn. 1999) (acknowledging the differences among jurisdictions in interpreting
knowledge and substantial assistance).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979).
23. Id. “For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of
another, one is subject to liability if he . . . knows that the other's conduct
constitutes a breach of duty.” Id.
24. See Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Barness, 611 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (holding that secondary actor’s belief that the primary actor’s conduct was
reasonable thwarts knowledge finding for aiding and abetting liability).
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elucidating knowledge in the context of aiding and abetting. The
standards that courts use vary from constructive knowledge to
26
actual knowledge. Whether a court applies a “looser” standard of
knowledge, either expressly or indirectly by failing to strictly
construe the higher standard of knowledge, may reflect the
27
For
underlying policy that the court is attempting to further.
example, in reviewing a claim under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA), the court applied a constructive
knowledge standard to impose liability on a project manager for
28
The
“knowingly participating” in a breach of fiduciary duty.
liberal standard derived from the common law of trusts, where the

25. See, e.g., FDIC v. First Interstate Bank, 885 F.2d 423, 429 (8th Cir. 1989)
(recognizing that “the content of the test is still being delineated by the courts,
with its significance not yet fully elaborated, by its nature the test is closely focused
on the facts of each case . . . .”); Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 624 (8th Cir.
1985) (stating that “[b]ecause the theory of aiding-and-abetting liability is a matter
of common law, the courts have not yet elaborated the full meaning of [§ 876]
factors.”). See generally Combs, supra note 14, at 264–67 (noting that the “judicial
test” derived from pre-Central Bank securities law, changes the knowledge inquiry
from the secondary actor “[knowing] that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach
of duty” to the secondary actor having a general awareness of “his role in another’s
wrong” and of “the way in which his conduct is contributing to the wrong.”).
26. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 888 (8th ed. 2004) (defining knowledge as
“[a]n awareness or understanding of a fact or circumstance; a state of mind in
which a person has no substantial doubt about the existence of a fact”; reckless
knowledge as “[a] person’s awareness that a prohibited circumstance may exist,
regardless of which the person accepts the risk and goes on to act”; constructive
knowledge is described as “[k]nowledge that one using reasonable care or
diligence should have, and therefore that is attributed by law to a given person,”
i.e. “the court held that the partners had constructive knowledge of the
partnership agreement even though none of them had read it.”).
27. See, e.g., Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 974 F.2d 270 (2d Cir.
1992) (using constructive knowledge standard to find defendant liable for
knowingly participating in breach of trust; the objective of ERISA's fiduciary
provisions was to make applicable the law of trusts and establish uniform fiduciary
standards to prevent transactions which dissipate or endanger plan assets and to
provide effective remedies for breaches of trust), overruled on other grounds by
Gerosa v. Savasta & Co., Inc., 329 F.3d 317, 327 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that ERISA
does not explicitly provide equitable relief against acts by non-fiduciaries,
preempting state common law claims against non-fiduciaries for ERISA violations).
Although Diduck may no longer be relied on as precedent, it exemplifies how
standards of knowledge may be used to affect certain results. See generally Richard
C. Mason, Civil Liability for Aiding and Abetting, 61 BUS. LAW. 1135 (2006)
(discussing standards of knowledge and substantial assistance in aiding and
abetting analyses of securities, Greenmail, attorneys, banking transactions, RICO,
trusts, and corporations).
28. Diduck, 974 F.2d at 283.
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policy of protecting a dependent and vulnerable beneficiary from
29
fiduciary misdeeds warrants the use of a lower standard.
Despite the of the intangible nature of some actions like fraud
and breach of fiduciary duty and the difficulty in showing actual
30
knowledge of the unlawful conduct, actual knowledge is the
prevailing standard set forth by most courts in analyzing aiding and
abetting claims.
Actual knowledge generally requires the
secondary actor to be “pretty sure” that the primary actor’s conduct
is unlawful and that the secondary actor’s own conduct assists or
31
encourages the primary actor.
This standard is typically very
difficult to prove. Courts that apply the actual knowledge standard
will do so when determining whether a professional providing
32
service in her field of specialty is liable for aiding and abetting.
In addition to determining what standard of knowledge
applies to aiding and abetting, courts must decide the extent to
which the secondary actor is liable for third party injuries. The
secondary actor’s knowledge may extend to the primary actor’s
tortious acts, which were not necessarily known but were
foreseeable in light of the circumstances. For example, in
Halberstam v. Welch, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held
that a live-in companion of the primary actor was liable for a death
33
that resulted from the primary actor’s burglary of a home. In
establishing the secondary actor’s knowledge of the primary actor’s
burglarizing activities, the court stated that:
[The primary actor’s] pattern of unaccompanied evening
jaunts over five years, his boxes of booty, the smelting of
29. Id. at 282–83 (citing the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 297 cmt. a
(1935), which states that a person has notice of a breach when “he knows or
should know of the breach . . . .”).
30. See Stanley Pietrusiak, Jr., Changing the Nature of Corporate Representation:
Attorney Liability for Aiding and Abetting the Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J.
213, 236–37 (1996) (discussing the elusive nature of actual knowledge and the
difficulty of establishing actual knowledge in aiding and abetting situations).
31. See Hashimoto v. Clark, 264 B.R. 585, 599 (D. Ariz. 2001) (stating that
evidence which, in retrospect, would raise red flags as to primary actor’s unlawful
conduct, is inconclusive as to the degree of knowledge that the secondary actor
had at the time of the breach).
32. See Witzman v. Lehrmen, Lehrmen & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179, 186–87
(Minn. 1999) (stating that courts that recognize aiding and abetting in
professional contexts rely on strict interpretation of the elements to preclude
meritless claims).
33. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that
secondary actor was liable in wrongful death action under the theories of aiding
and abetting and conspiracy).
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gold and silver, the sudden influx of great wealth, the
filtering of all transactions through [the secondary actor]
except payouts for goods, [the secondary actor’s] collusive
and unsubstantiated treatment of income and deductions
on her tax forms, even her protestations at trial that she
knew absolutely nothing about [the primary actor’s]
wrongdoing—combine to make the district court’s
inference that she knew he was engaged in illegal
34
activities acceptable, to say the least.
Instead of limiting the secondary actor’s knowledge to
knowledge of the act of burglarizing, the court broadened the
conduct of which the secondary actor had knowledge by defining
35
the primary actor’s act as a “criminal enterprise.” Therefore, the
secondary actor was liable for all foreseeable incidents arising from
36
the criminal enterprise.
B. Substantial Assistance Generally
After the court finds that a secondary actor had knowledge of
the primary actor’s breach of duty, the court must determine if the
secondary actor substantially assisted or encouraged the primary
37
Whether the secondary actor’s
actor in breaching the duty.
conduct amounts to substantial assistance is dependent on the
jurisdictions’ various applications of the element. Even the terms
that courts use when referring to this third element are not
38
uniform.
In torts that involve physical injury or property damage, the
existence of the third element is often apparent. The secondary
actor’s conduct consists of either direct words or acts that are in
proximity both in place and in time to the primary actor’s wrongful
39
conduct.
34. Id. at 486.
35. Id. at 488.
36. Id. at 487–89.
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979).
38. See Holmes v. Young, 885 P.2d 305, 309 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (knowing
participation); see also S & K Sales Co. v. Nike, Inc., 816 F.2d 843, 849 (2d Cir.
1987) (knowing assistance). See generally Bryan C. Barksdale, Redefining Obligations
in Close Corporation Fiduciary Representation: Attorney Liability for Aiding and Abetting
the Breach of Fiduciary Duties in Squeeze-outs, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 551, 559–60
(2001) (evaluating elements of knowledge and substantial assistance in the
squeeze-out contexts in Oregon and California).
39. See, e.g., Rael v. Cadena, 604 P.2d 822 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979) (aiding and
abetting a battery where secondary actor’s words encouraged primary actor’s
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Substantial assistance does not require physical acts; advice or
encouragement may be sufficient to find a secondary actor liable
40
41
for aiding and abetting.
For example, in Rael v. Cadena, a
secondary actor was liable for aiding and abetting a battery when
he encouraged the primary actor by yelling “[k]ill him” and “[h]it
42
Unfortunately, in more complex situations,
him more!”
substantial assistance or encouragement is rarely as blatant as in
Rael. Substantial assistance or encouragement is often indirect
43
both in time and place, and courts often struggle with the analysis.
The determination of whether a secondary actor provided
substantial assistance or encouragement to a primary actor in
44
breaching a duty is highly contextual.
The contextual nature
results from the fact that the relationships between primary actors
and third parties, and the duties owed therein, are unique.
Comment (d) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876,
provides a framework to aid a court in evaluating whether
45
The Restatement’s
secondary actor’s assistance is substantial.
factors include: (1) the nature of the act encouraged; (2) the
amount of assistance given by the defendant; (3) her presence or
absence at the time of the tort; (4) her relationship to the fiduciary;
46
and (5) the defendant’s state of mind.
In addition to these

conduct); Cobb v. Indian Springs, Inc., 522 S.W.2d 383 (Ark. 1975) (aiding and
abetting youth’s reckless conduct found where security guard encouraged youth to
test out a new car by driving it at high speeds); Keel v. Hainline, 331 P.2d 397
(Okla. 1958) (aiding and abetting battery found where child picked up erasers
from floor and gave erasers to other children for the purpose of throwing at
others in class, causing nonparticipating student to sustain eye injury).
40. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing Rael, 604
P.2d at 823).
41. 604 P.2d 822 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979).
42. Id. at 822.
43. See generally Pietrusiak, supra note 30, at 246–54 (1996) (discussing that
application of aiding and abetting to the S&L situation, which created further
confusion in determining knowledge).
44. Id. at 235–36 (noting that in addition to the courts’ continuing struggle to
apply the knowledge requirement, substantial assistance is difficult to ascertain
because certain actors in certain situations may meet the elements, while other
actors may not).
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d (1979).
46. Id. The factors, which many courts use to determine substantial
assistance, are derived from Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 97–
100 (5th Cir. 1975) (addressing these factors that may be used in determining
substantial assistance and concluding that Metro Bank was not liable for aiding
and abetting an entrepreneur’s violation of 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934).
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factors, the length of the relationship between the primary actor
and the secondary actor, as well as the duration of the secondary
actor’s activity, may establish substantial assistance by implying an
47
agreement between the two actors.
Substantial assistance or encouragement typically takes the
form of affirmative acts, but some courts have found that silence or
48
Nonfeasance may
inaction constitutes substantial assistance.
result in substantial assistance where the secondary actor
consciously intended his silence to assist the primary actor in a
49
wrongful act. Yet, silence or inaction does not give rise to liability
for aiding and abetting in situations where there is no affirmative
50
duty of a secondary actor to help, notify, or aid a third party. The
narrow scope of cases in which silence or inaction constitutes
substantial assistance comports with common law treatment of the
duty to assist others. A person’s duty to prevent injuries to third
parties is limited to situations where there is a “special relationship”
51
between that person and the injured third party. The application
47. See Halberstram v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(“Additionally, the length of time two parties work closely together may also
strengthen the likelihood that they are engaged in a common pursuit. Mutually
supportive activity by parties in contact with one another over a long period
suggests a common plan.”).
48. See Schiller v. Strangis, 540 F. Supp. 605, 624 (D. Mass. 1982) (imposing
liability onto a joint tortfeasor who knowingly joined in committing the tort of
false imprisonment because his “silence” encouraged the primary actor to commit
subsequent tortious acts).
49. See generally Patrick J. McNulty & Daniel J. Hanson, Liability for Aiding and
Abetting by Silence or Inaction: An Unfounded Doctrine, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 14, 27
(1993) (quoting SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1317 (6th Cir. 1974) (“Inaction may
be a form of assistance in certain cases, but only where it is shown that silence of
the accused aider and abetter was consciously intended to aid the securities law
violation.”)).
50. See Pietrusiak, supra note 30, at 238–39 (“[T]he issue is not whether the
party directly assisted the primary tortfeasor by direct advice or support, but
whether the actor was obligated to ‘disclose or stop another’s wrongdoing
discovered in the performance of normal and customary business activities.’”).
51. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.
189, 190 (1989). The court in DeShaney recognized that “certain ‘special
relationships’ created or assumed by the State with respect to particular
individuals may give rise to an affirmative duty.” Id. at 189. That was not the case,
however, in the facts of DeShaney:
No such duty existed here, for the harms petitioner suffered occurred
not while the State was holding him in its custody, but while he was in the
custody of his natural father, who was in no sense a state actor. While the
State may have been aware of the dangers that he faced, it played no part
in their creation, nor did it do anything to render him more vulnerable
to them.
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of silence or inaction to meet the substantial assistance element is
rare in modern-day civil aiding and abetting cases where there are
no special relationships.
III. AIDING AND ABETTING BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
A. Fiduciary Duties
1.

Plain Vanilla

The determination of whether a secondary actor aids and
abets a primary actor’s breach of fiduciary duty is contingent upon
52
the primary actor owing a fiduciary duty to the third party. In
typical aiding and abetting analyses, the existence of a fiduciary
duty is implicit. Fiduciary duties include the duty of loyalty and the
53
The duty of loyalty requires the fiduciary to be
duty of care.
honest and refrain from competing with the entrustor (the person
to whom the fiduciary owes the fiduciary duty). The duty of care
essentially means that the fiduciary must act carefully and
54
responsibly when acting on behalf of the entrustor.
Historically, the presence of fiduciary duties was strongest in

Id. at 190. See also Pietrusiak, supra note 30, at 238–39 (“[The] general rule in
modern tort law is that one is under no duty to prevent injury to another person,
even if one knows the other is in danger of being injured.”).
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979) (noting a person is
liable if she “knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty”) (emphasis
added). See, e.g., Alexander v. Anstine, 152 P.3d 497, 503 (Colo. 2007) (reversing
the lower court’s holding that under Colorado common law, a president of an
insolvent corporation owes broad fiduciary duties, beyond “[avoiding] favoring
their own interests over creditors’ claims,” to hypothetical judgment lien
creditors). The Alexander court further opined:
[T]o determine whether [hypothetical judgment creditor] has standing
to sue the attorneys for aiding and abetting the president's breach of
fiduciary duty, we must determine whether judgment lien creditors may
sue a corporation's president for a breach of fiduciary duty under
Colorado law. To determine what claims are available to creditors, we
now turn to an examination of the duties owed by the directors and
officers of an insolvent corporation to the corporation's creditors.
Id. at 501.
53. See, e.g., Ostrowski v. Avery, 703 A.2d 117, 121–22 (Conn. 1997) (noting
the historical fiduciary duties of directors).
54. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing
United States v. Margiotta, 668 F.2d 108, 125 (2d Cir. 1982) (“‘[A]t the heart of
the fiduciary relationship’ lies ‘reliance, and de facto control and dominance.’”).
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the contexts of trusts where a high degree of confidence in the
trustee was necessary for the protection and well-being of the
55
beneficiary.
Indeed, the trust and confidence that one party
places in another with whom there are disparities in dominance
and in position are salient elements of the fiduciary relationship.
The potential vulnerability of the beneficiary derives from the
trustee’s dominant position, combined with the great degree of
trust and autonomy the trustee is given to pursue the best interests
56
of the beneficiary. When a trustee has the right to act for the
beneficiary and the power to pursue the beneficiary’s objectives
with discretion, the beneficiary is in a precarious position because
57
the trustee’s power may be abused. A fiduciary’s breach has the
propensity of being devastating to the beneficiary. Determining
whether an actor is a fiduciary, along with the concomitant duties,
58
is a question of law. Therefore, the role of the fiduciary is a device
courts may use in appropriate circumstances to ensure that the
trust and confidence of a vulnerable party is not abused.
Courts recognize fiduciary duties in a number of areas in
addition to trusts. Reasoning primarily by analogy, courts apply
fiduciary principles developed through trust law to achieve
59
For example, courts
equitable results in the various contexts.
have compared the loyalty that a trustee owes to a beneficiary to
60
that which an officer of a corporation owes to the corporation.
Generally, in both cases, the fiduciary is barred from acting out of
self-interest, and the entrustor exercises little control over the
fiduciary’s daily actions, causing the entrustor to be in a vulnerable
position. In addition, fiduciary relationships arise in the contexts

55. See Robert W. Tuttle, The Fiduciary’s Fiduciary: Legal Ethics in Fiduciary
Representation, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 889, 895–96 (1994) (providing a historical
analysis of fiduciary duties).
56. See id. at 897 (discussing the vulnerability of beneficiary).
57. See id.
58. See Gliko v. Permann, 130 P.3d 155, 159–60 (Mont. 2006) (overruling a
line of cases in which the existence of a fiduciary duty is a question of fact).
59. See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation,
1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 880 (1988) (noting that “[a]s equity evolved, concrete rules in
many instances supplanted the chancellors' exercise of discretion based on broad
principles.”).
60. See Harold Marsh Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate
Morality, 22 BUS. LAW. 35, 36–40 (1966) (describing directors’ fiduciary duties in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries).
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of agency, bailments, guardianships, corporations and legal
61
representation, among others.
The preceding relationships are similar to trusts in that they
involve a fiduciary undertaking a duty to act in the best interests of
62
another who has put trust and confidence in that fiduciary. In
these contexts, the fiduciary is in a position of inherent power and
responsibility where actions motivated by self-interest are
proscribed. Because of the potential for the fiduciary to abuse her
power, it is necessary for the protection of the entrustor (the
principal, the bailor, the ward, the corporation, or the client) that a
higher level of duty be imposed upon the one in whom another has
63
trusted and confided.
The fiduciary relationship that exists between two parties varies
64
according to the context in which they arise. One element that
varies among fiduciary relationships is the degree of control that
the entrustor has over the fidicuary. In the trust context, the
beneficiary is relatively powerless to control the acts of the trustee;
however, in the agency context, the principal has a great degree of
65
power over the agent’s actions.
Although the scope of duties
between the fiduciary and the entrustor is unique to that
relationship, an important characteristic of the aforementioned
fiduciary relationships is the one-way fiduciary duty owed by the
fiduciary to the entrustor.

61. See generally Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795 (1983)
(examining the differences and similarities among fiduciaries and how history has
impacted the various duties in each relationship).
62. Haluka v. Baker, 34 N.E.2d 68 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941) (examining the
agent’s duty to act in the best interests of the principal).
63. In addition to the duty of loyalty, fiduciaries owe to the entrustor the duty
of care. Variables existent in fiduciary duties include the standard of care used by
the fiduciary in exercising its role and the degree of control the entrustor has over
the fiduciary. For example, where a director of a corporation owes the duty of
care to the corporation, the standard of conduct used to impose liability upon the
director is gross negligence. See generally Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d. 244 (Del.
2000). This is in contrast to a trustee, which must refrain from negligent conduct
in performing its role as a fiduciary. The duty of care is relevant in aiding and
abetting cases because the secondary actor’s negligence alone, without knowledge
and substantial assistance, will not give rise to liability. As a result, in a case
involving lawyer liability, a plaintiff’s claim is foreclosed when the lawyer assistance
was the result of mere negligence in advising her client/defendant.
64. See DeMott, supra note 59, at 880–81 (distinguishing fiduciary duties in
corporate law and those in the trust context).
65. Even within the agency context, the power and control that the principal
has over the agent varies immensely according to the terms of the agreement.
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There are some critical distinctions between the liability
imposed on a fiduciary for directly breaching a fiduciary duty and
that which is imposed on a secondary actor for merely assisting the
66
breach.
A fiduciary who breaches a duty may be liable to the
67
entrustor, regardless of whether the breach was intentional.
Accordingly, a fiduciary’s negligent breach of fiduciary duty will
68
amount to liability.
A fiduciary’s liability for unknowingly or
intentionally breaching a duty, therefore, is conceptually similar to
strict liability because it lacks the requirement of a specific mental
69
state. In contrast, the scope of the secondary actor’s liability is
comparatively narrower. A secondary actor’s negligent conduct,
which in some way contributes to a fiduciary’s breach, will not give
70
rise to liability.
2.

Inter se Fiduciary Relationships in Closely-Held Businesses

In the context of closely-held businesses such as partnerships,
closely-held corporations, and limited liability companies, inter se
duties developed and are most often at issue in situations in which
66. See Robert W. Tuttle, The Fiduciary’s Fiduciary: Legal Ethics in Fiduciary
Representation, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 889, 901 (1994) (discussing the differences of
primary liability and secondary liability with regard to the liability imposed on one
who breaches a fiduciary duty and one who knowingly assists another in breaching
a fiduciary duty).
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496, 502–04 (Ill. 2000). In Neade, the
court established that a fiduciary relationship existed between the defendant
physician and the physician’s patient. Id. In treating the patient symptoms, the
physician failed to order specific tests, which resulted in the patient’s death. Id. at
498–99. In examining the causes of action brought forth by the decedent’s
estate—including breach of fiduciary duty and malpractice—the court recognized
that although the facts the estate set forth would establish a breach of fiduciary
duty, the court would not recognize it as a cause of action because the same facts
and elements gave rise to a duplicative and recognized medical malpractice cause
of action. Id. passim. But see JOSEPH WARREN BISHOP II, LAW OF CORPORATE
OFFICERS & DIRECTORS: INDEMNIFICATION & INSURANCE § 3:23 (2008) (noting that
the concept of gross negligence is the standard for determining whether the
business judgment exercised by the board of directors was informed and thus not
a breach of the director’s duty of care).
69. See Tuttle, supra note 66, at 901 (examining the broad scope of liability
that the fiduciary faces for breaches).
70. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979) (setting forth
the elements of aiding and abetting). Restricting the scope of liability to conduct
that is “knowing” is in conformity with the policy behind many courts’ use of
actual knowledge as the requisite standard of knowledge—it is undesirable and
unfair to hold people liable for another’s tort unless they knew what they were
doing. Id.
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71

a gross imbalance of power exists. In closely-held businesses with
decentralized management, which may include any of the
aforementioned entities, management duties (including daily
operating procedures and policies and general long-term business
72
Co-owners may
plans) are directly controlled by the owners.
agree to the allocation of various means of control upon business
73
formation. With this control comes heightened duties owed by
those who possess it. To guard against the majority owner exerting
his dominance at the expense of the minority owner, co-owners
74
owe each other inter se fiduciary duties.
Inter se duties are
distinguished from ordinary fiduciary duties owed by managers in
that inter se duties are peculiar to the co-owners without regard to
75
management position.
In contracts, parties dealing at arm’s length are limited only by
the requirement that they must act in good faith; however, there is
a distinctive difference between the duties owed by parties dealing
at arm’s length and the duties owed by parties who are closely
76
involved in a common pursuit.
Co-owners are fiduciaries and
although the relationship between co-owners substantially differs
from the relationship between a trustee and beneficiary, it is still
one that involves loyalty and care. It is axiomatic that a higher level
of duty should be imposed upon those who invest their labor and
77
capital in a common enterprise. Justice Cardozo’s oft repeated
maxim “[n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the

71. See Mary Siegel, Fiduciary Duty Myths in Close Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 377, 383–84 (2004).
72. See Ann E. Conaway & Robert R. Keatinge, Fiduciary Duties of Owners and
Managers in Closely-Held Businesses and Contractual Relationships or Co-Ownerships,
VML0202 ALI-ABA 119, 121 (2006) (examining the fiduciary duties and
contractual duties in small businesses).
73. Daniel S. Kleinberger, Why Not Good Faith? The Foibles of Fairness in the Law
of Close Corporations, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1143, 1148 (1990) (distinguishing
the obligations and rights of owners in closely-held corporations from
corporations).
74. Id. at 1153.
75. Id.
76. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (“Many forms of
conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are
forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.”).
77. See Dennis J. Callahan, Medieval Church Norms and Fiduciary Duties in
Partnership, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 215, 252 (2004) (noting that special relationships
between merchants were the original source of fiduciary duties in joint ventures in
the sixteenth century).
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most sensitive” emphasizes the importance of fiduciary duties
78
within the co-owner relationship.
Upon entering into a business relationship, co-owners have a
reasonable expectation of their position and rights within the
79
business. Reasonable expectations may derive from the terms of
the co-owners’ agreement upon formation; however, issues that
were not initially discussed among the co-owners may later arise
80
and cause conflict. Indeed, in addition to express agreements,
the conduct of the parties may give rise to reasonable
81
expectations.
To uphold a co-owner’s reasonable expectations
and to protect the minority owner from being wrongfully excluded
from participating in the business, some courts have imposed a
82
general right not to be oppressed.
Because oppression results
from a majority owner depriving a minority owner of some
reasonable expectation, courts are left to examine and sift through
the parties’ agreements and conduct to determine what their
83
reasonable expectations are.
Corresponding with this right is the duty of the co-owners not
84
to perpetuate oppressive conduct. As referenced above, fiduciary
relationships in the context of closely-held business differ from that
85
of trusts. The interdiction of any acts by the trustee motivated by
self-interest is not present in closely-held businesses. In closely-held
businesses, self-interests are present as co-owners have different
86
notions of what is best for the business. Because majority owners
may be in the position where they must make a business decision
that is incongruent with the minority owner’s wishes, they are
78. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546.
79. Kleinberger, supra note 73, at 1155–56 (discussing in detail the existence
of reasonable expectations in closely-held corporations and noting the difficulty in
this concept as owners’ reasonable expectations may conflict).
80. Id. at 1149 (examining McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234 (1934)).
81. Id. at 1155–56 (discussing in detail the existence of reasonable
expectations in closely-held corporations and noting the difficulty in this concept
as owners’ reasonable expectations may conflict).
82. Id. at 1151–53.
83. See Joseph W. Anthony & Karlyn Vegoe Boraas, Betrayed, Belittled . . . But
Triumphant: Claims of Shareholders in Closely Held Corporations, 22 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1173, 1178–79 (1996) (explaining reasonable expectations may include
lifetime employment and compensation).
84. Kleinberger, supra note 73, at 1153 (describing the right not to be
oppressed as direct, arising out of the relationship between the owners, not the
relationship between the entity and the aggrieved owner).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 76–78.
86. Kleinberger, supra note 73, at 1157–60.
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87

entitled to the right of “selfish ownership.” For example, in a
88
leading case, Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts proclaimed that “the controlling
group in a close corporation must have some room to maneuver in
89
establishing the business policy.” Therefore, majority owners may
exercise discretion in making decisions regarding a business even if
it harms a minority owner so long as (1) there is a legitimate
purpose, and (2) the majority owners’ objective could not be
90
accomplished through less destructive means.
Where selfish ownership is intertwined with the duty of loyalty,
courts are inconsistent in their analyses of breach of fiduciary cases
among co-owners in closely-held businesses. The examination of
whether a co-owner in a closely-held business has breached a
fiduciary duty is fact intensive, and the evaluators’ individual moral
91
beliefs may affect the final determination. Where one court finds
92
a breach of fiduciary duty, another may not.
The inconsistencies that are prevalent among courts’ decisions
involving fiduciary duties are indicative of the origin from which
93
they arose: the English court of equity. Where law failed to give
an adequate remedy for one whose trust and confidence was
94
abused, equity provided relief. The Chancellors of the courts of
equity had a great degree of discretion when deciding a case;
95
fairness and equity prevailed over consistency and predictability.
This theme remains in modern day fiduciary duty analysis and
manifests itself in the closely-held business context.

87. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass.
1976).
88. 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
89. Id. at 663.
90. Id. at 663.
91. See DeMott, supra note 59, at 891–92.
92. See, e.g., Landstrom v. Shaver, 561 N.W.2d 1, 7–12 (S.D. 1997) (overruling
the trial court’s determination of oppression by applying both the reasonable
expectations test and the burdensome, harsh, and wrongful conduct test).
93. See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND.
L. REV. 1399, 1452–78 (2002) (examining the numerous fiduciary relationships
arising out of equity courts).
94. Id. at 1493–94 (addressing possible remedies, in law and in equity,
available for breaches of fiduciary duties).
95. See DeMott, supra note 59, at 880–82.
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B. Lawyer’s Liability for Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty
1.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Breaches of fiduciary duty do not fall neatly within the
confines of traditional tort law because a breach of fiduciary duty is
a civil cause of action for which damages or equitable relief, such as
96
disgorgement, may be awarded. Furthermore, depending on the
remedy the plaintiff seeks, a breach of fiduciary duty claim does not
97
necessarily give rise to a jury trial. Despite the equitable nature of
fiduciary duties, breaches of these duties are likened to torts for the
98
purpose of imposing aiding and abetting liability.
The
Restatement provides a basis of liability for those who know “that
the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives
substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct
99
himself . . . .” Section 876(b) provides the foundation upon which
most civil aiding and abetting decisions are based.
The
Restatement’s elements—the underlying breach of duty, the
secondary actor’s knowledge of that breach, and the secondary
actor’s substantial assistance furthering the breach—are prevalent
in decisions in which courts have addressed the issue of whether
liability may be imposed for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary
100
duty.
2.

Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty by Lawyers
a.

Policy

Though one who aids and abets a fiduciary in breaching a duty
may be subject to liability, determining whether a lawyer should be
96. See id.
97. See Pereira v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330, 338 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that when
determining whether breach of fiduciary duty claim was an action at law or in
equity, lower court should have applied a two-part test: first, whether the action
would have been equitable in eighteenth century England, and second, whether
the remedy sought was equitable or legal in nature (citing Grafinanciera v.
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989))).
98. See, e.g., Zastrow v. Journal Commc’ns, Inc., 718 N.W.2d 51, 60 (Wis.
2006) (stating that breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty is an intentional tort and
distinguishing it from the duty of care element of negligence which is an issue of
carelessness).
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979).
100. Id.
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liable for assisting her client’s breach of fiduciary duty adds
complexity to the aiding and abetting analysis. The determination
compels courts to reconcile distinct and perhaps equally important
fiduciary relationships that conflict. The question of whether
lawyers should be included in the scope of secondary actors subject
101
to liability for aiding and abetting is an issue of growing concern.
It is commonly held that lawyers do not owe duties to non102
When a fiduciary breaches his duty of loyalty with the
clients.
substantial assistance of his lawyer, the causes of action against the
lawyer that are afforded to the entrustor are limited. The lack of
privity between the entrustor and the lawyer eliminates the
entrustor’s ability to assert a malpractice claim against that
103
104
lawyer.
For example, in Spinner v. Nutt, the trustee’s lawyer
failed to advise the trustee to make an investment in which there
was a high probability of yielding a substantial profit for the trust.
The court held that the beneficiaries of the trust were neither the
105
Thus
lawyer’s clients nor intended beneficiaries of the contract.
the plaintiffs’ malpractice claim failed because the lawyer’s conduct
was negligent and not intentionally done to assist the trustee in
106
depriving the trust of the expected profits.

101. See generally Richard Mason, Civil Aiding and Abetting, 61 BUS. LAW. 1135,
1136 (2006) (noting that civil aiding and abetting provides a cause of action
against professionals and is increasingly being used to hold professionals liable for
underlying torts).
102. See McIntosh County Bank v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP,
N.W.2d
, No.
A06-486, 2008 WL 598288, at *5 (Minn. March 6, 2008) (recognizing that,
generally, “an attorney is liable for professional negligence only to a person with
whom he has an attorney-client relationship.”). This rule has been relaxed in
some states. See, e.g., Calvert v. Scharf, 619 S.E.2d 197, 203–04 (W. Va. 2005)
(holding that under certain circumstances a beneficiary will have standing to sue a
lawyer for malpractice if the lawyer negligently drafts the will for which the
plaintiff is the beneficiary); Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961) (discerning
that a lawyer may be liable to third party beneficiaries in certain situations).
103. See, e.g., Cacciola v. Nellhaus, 733 N.E.2d 133, 137–39 (Mass. App. Ct.
2000) (holding that a partner could not bring forth a claim for legal malpractice
absent an “express [individual] attorney-client relationship,” but providing other
grounds for relief to a disgruntled owner by holding that the lawyer representing
the partnership owed direct fiduciary duties to all partners); Am. Centennial Ins.
Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 843 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Tex. 1992) (examining the policy
reasons supporting the strict privity requirement for malpractice claims).
104. 631 N.E.2d 542 (Mass. 1994).
105. Id. at 544–45 (holding that trustee’s lawyers did not owe duty of care to
beneficiaries).
106. Id. at 546 (stating that “[a]n allegation that the trustees acted under the
legal advice of the [lawyers], without more, is insufficient to give rise to a claim
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Lawyers representing fiduciaries are in a unique position,
especially when those fiduciaries are obligated to act with
107
undivided loyalty to and in the best interests of the entrustor. In
these cases, a lawyer’s representation may be limited to advising the
client in acting in his role as a fiduciary. In light of the limited
scope of the lawyer’s representation, it is questionable whether the
lawyer’s representation to the fiduciary client would ever
encompass advising the fiduciary to breach its duty to the
108
entrustor —an act that neither the lawyer nor the client has the
right to do. For example, where a trustee’s lawyer assists the trustee
in depleting trust assets to pay off the trustee’s personal gambling
debts, there is little justification for protecting the lawyer’s right to
109
advise her client to act unlawfully.
Even a cursory review of aiding and abetting law will reveal that
lawyers should not be immune from a court’s application of liability
if the requisite elements of the Restatement section 876(b) are
110
found. Although the lawyer-client relationship is a fiduciary one,
this relationship should not negate the lawyer complying with the
general duty to refrain from knowingly and substantially assisting
another in violating the law. In addition to the obvious argument
that no one should be “above the law,” other policies provide
cogent reasons why lawyers should be included, at least in some
contexts, among possible aiders and abettors.
Fiduciary
relationships are pervasive, and the widespread presence of

that [a lawyer] is responsible to third persons for the fraudulent acts of his
clients.”).
107. Generally, lawyers representing fiduciaries are not in fiduciary
relationships with their clients’ entrustors. See Am. Cenntennial Ins. Co., 843 S.W.
2d at 484. It may, however, be argued that where the client has no self-interest in
its relationship with the entrustor, the lawyer’s advice would never fall outside the
scope of acting in the best interests of the entrustor. But see ABA Comm. On
Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-380 (1994) (finding that a lawyer’s
role is restricted to lawyer’s loyalties to fiduciary-client and that this arrangement
allows the lawyer to understand her role in representing the fiduciary and
encourages the client to be forthright with the lawyer).
108. See Barksdale, supra note 38, at 598–99 (providing policy reasons why
lawyers should be immune from liability).
109. See, e.g., Wolf v. Mitchell, Silberberg, & Knupp, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 792 (Ct.
App. 1999) (holding the beneficiary’s allegations were sufficient to state claim
against trustee’s lawyer under exception to general rule against trust beneficiaries’
standing for a third party’s active participation in breach of trust).
110. See Barksdale, supra note 38, at 601 (discussing the role lawyers play in
clients’ breaches of fiduciary duties in closely-held businesses and advocating for
lawyer accountability to third parties for aiding and abetting clients’ breaches).
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fiduciary duties emphasizes their importance to modern-day
society. Protecting the entrustor in a fiduciary relationship furthers
important objectives of both tort law and fiduciary law such as
protecting the innocent party, compensating the victim, and
111
Trust and loyalty are
encouraging socially desirable behavior.
fundamental to fiduciary relationships.
Not all courts find the policies supporting the liability of
lawyers persuasive. California, for example, establishes multiple
112
barriers to liability for participating in clients’ breaches.
Similar
to a malpractice claim, the entrustor’s ability to assert a claim
against the lawyer for breach of fiduciary duty is often foreclosed
due to the lack of privity between an entrustor and the fiduciary’s
lawyer. In addition, California’s strong public policy of protecting
the trust and confidence existent in the lawyer-client relationship is
exemplified by the broad scope of the agent’s immunity doctrine,
113
discussed infra.
Despite the policies supporting lawyer immunity, the majority
of jurisdictions that have addressed the issue of a lawyer’s liability
for assisting her client’s breach of fiduciary duty recognize that
114
lawyers may be held liable. The scope of this liability, however, is
quintessentially unclear. The lack of clarity derives from both the
lawyer’s position as a fiduciary to her client and the elusive nature

111. See Tuttle, supra note 55 at 901; see also John C.P. Goldberg, TwentiethCentury Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513 (2003) (broadly categorizing the objectives of
tort law into at least five groups: compensation-deterrence theory, enterprise
liability theory, economic deterrence theory, social justice theory, and individual
justice theory).
112. See infra Part IV.
113. See generally Reynolds v. Schrock, 142 P.3d 1062 (Or. 2006) (holding that a
lawyer acting within the scope of representation may not be held liable for aiding
and abetting her client’s breach of fiduciary duty). But see Tuttle, supra note 55, at
934 (describing the underlying rationale for protecting confidentiality: the law
protects communications between lawyer and client so that the lawyer can help
conform his conduct to the law’s requirements); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.2(d) (2006) (“a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed
course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good
faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.”).
For more discussion regarding a lawyer’s immunity from liablity under the agency
theory see infra Part IV.
114. See Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman, & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179, 186–87
(Minn. 1999) (stating that “most courts in addressing [aiding and abetting clients’
fiduciary duties] have not excluded professionals from aiding and abetting
liability.”). But see Pavicich v. Santucci, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 125, 131–35 (Ct. App.
2000) (holding that under agency principals, attorneys are not liable for client’s
breaches when acting within their scope of representation).
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of the second and third elements of aiding and abetting,
knowledge and substantial assistance.
b.

Knowledge

The second element of aiding and abetting is the lawyer’s
knowledge that her client’s (the primary actor) conduct constitutes
115
Though most courts use actual
a breach of fiduciary duty.
knowledge as the standard for determining aiding and abetting
liability to lawyers, few courts spend any significant time delineating
what actual knowledge is and what facts support the existence of
actual knowledge. Black’s Law Dictionary defines actual knowledge
as “[d]irect and clear knowledge, as distinguished from
constructive knowledge” and that it exists where a person sees
116
something “first hand.”
Constructive knowledge is knowledge
117
that “one using reasonable care or diligence should have.”
Knowledge is, therefore, contextual, “attributed by law to a given
118
Constructive knowledge requires an objective inquiry,
person.”
as opposed to actual knowledge, which requires a subjective
119
inquiry.
Where a court employs the actual knowledge standard
in determining liability of lawyers for aiding and abetting, “red
flags,” which should alert the lawyer to her client’s breach, may not
120
be enough.
The requirement of actual knowledge, therefore,

115. For more discussion of the knowledge element of aiding and abetting see
infra Part III.
116. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 888 (8th ed. 2004). See also In re Lee Memory
Gardens, Inc., 333 B.R. 76, 80 (Bankr. M.D. N.C. 2005) (having knowledge means
“[a]n awareness or understanding of a fact or circumstance; a state of mind in
which a person has no substantial doubt about the existence about a fact.”
(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 888 (8th ed. 2004))).
117. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 888 (8th ed. 2004).
118. Id.
119. See Combs, supra note 14, at 283 n.204.
120. See Invest Almaz v. Temple-Inland Forest Prods. Corp., 243 F.3d 57, 83
(5th Cir. 2001) (“to act knowingly means to act with actual knowledge. This means
that [the plaintiff] must prove that [the defendant] actually knew two things: that
[the primary actor] owed a fiduciary duty to [the plaintiff] and that [the primary
actor] was breaching that duty. It is not enough for [the plaintiff] to show that
[the defendant] would have known these things if it had exercised reasonable
care.”). But see McNulty & Hanson, supra note 49, at 43–44 (noting that in
analyzing the requirement of actual knowledge, plaintiff may prove defendant had
knowledge by circumstantial evidence, usually through a series of “red flags” that
leads one to ask how the defendant could not have seen them along the way, but
recognizing that “[t]here is a danger in such a must-have-known analysis . . . [in
that] the secondary actor's alleged awareness of the fraud is subjected to the
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guards against a lawyer being obligated to investigate any
reasonably questionable business decisions of her client.
Where there is an obvious breach of fiduciary duty, a court
could easily find the requisite degree of knowledge to impose
aiding and abetting liability onto a lawyer without making a lawyer
an investigator with respect to her client’s business decisions. An
obvious breach is more likely to exist when a fiduciary’s primary
objective is to act in the best interests of the entrustor because
conduct that falls outside of the scope of what is considered “in the
121
A lawyer’s exposure to aiding and
best interests” is evident.
abetting liability when the boundaries of the fiduciary’s conduct
are clear is exhibited in the trust context. For example, in a
situation where a trustee commingles trust assets with his own and
takes from the trust in order to pay personal debts, the fiduciary’s
conduct is clearly outside the scope of what is in the best interests
122
of the beneficiary.
The underlying breach is quickly detected.
Therefore, where a lawyer assists the trustee in acting in a way that
is contrary to the trustee’s role as a fiduciary, the second element of
aiding and abetting—knowledge of the underlying breach—is
more easily found.
The ease with which courts find knowledge of underlying
obvious breaches is exemplified in In re Senior Cottages of America,
123
In that case, the court found that the plaintiff’s complaint
LLC.
adequately stated an aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty
124
claim against the lawyer.
The primary actor was a manager,
governor, and majority owner of Senior Cottages of America,
125
LLC.
Senior Cottages was an insolvent limited liability company
scalpel of the legal dissector, not from the vantage of foresight, but from the
perspective of omniscient hindsight.”).
121. See, e.g., Cal Pak Delivery, Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d
207, 213 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that “[s]urreptitiously contacting the opposing
party and offering to dismiss a client's action or forego filing a valid cause of action
in return for payment of fees directly to the attorney, creates a conflict of interest
and constitutes an obvious breach of the attorney's fiduciary obligation to the
client.”) (internal citations omitted).
122. See, e.g., Wolf v. Mitchell, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 792 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding
that the beneficiary’s allegations were sufficient to state a cause of action under an
exception to the general rule against the trust beneficiaries asserting claims
against third parties).
123. 482 F.3d 997 (8th Cir. 2007) (reversing the lower court’s conclusion that
bankruptcy trustee lacked standing to assert claims against manager and attorney
for aiding and abetting).
124. Id. at 1007.
125. Id. at 999.
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that operated nursing homes eligible for low-income housing tax
126
Before filing bankruptcy, the majority owner formed an
credits.
independent limited liability company to benefit from the tax
127
credits.
Instead of finding an arm’s-length buyer, the majority
owner transferred Senior Cottages’s assets to the independent
128
limited liability company.
The independent company did not
give a “reasonably equivalent value” in exchange for the credits and
129
The majority
this arrangement was found to be fraudulent.
owner stripping the business of its assets constitutes an obvious
breach of fiduciary duty to the business. Therefore, it had to have
been obvious to the lawyer when the lawyer advised the majority in
structuring the arrangement that depleted Senior Cottages’s
130
assets.
c.

Substantial Assistance

In general, for a lawyer to be liable for aiding and abetting her
client’s breach of fiduciary duty, the lawyer must provide
131
substantial assistance in furtherance of that breach.
In practice,
132
liability may turn on how much substantial assistance is enough.
Similar to the challenges that courts face in grasping the
knowledge element, courts find difficulty in the ambiguity of the
substantial assistance element. This difficulty is evidenced in
reviewing the various applications of the third element.

126. Id. at 999–1000.
127. Id. at 1000.
128. Id.
129. Id. (referring to findings of an earlier Minnesota state court decision,
DKM II, Inc. v. Senior Cottages of America, LLC, No. 98-16654 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr.
12, 2000), and stating that decision was incorporated by reference in the amended
complaint).
130. Id. at 1007. The complaint plead that the majority owner:
[B]reached his fiduciary duties to Senior Cottages in stripping the
company of its assets without reasonable compensation; that [law firm]
knew that [majority owner’s] actions were in breach of his fiduciary
duties; and that [law firm] provided substantial assistance to [majority
owner] and advised its client, Senior Cottages, to conclude the
transaction. These allegations are sufficient to plead a claim for aiding
and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty.
Id.
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979) (requiring substantial
assistance for civil aiding and abetting liability).
132. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (providing a
detailed analysis of substantial assistance finding).
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Some courts refer to substantial assistance as knowing
133
participation, the gravamen of an aiding and abetting claim.
These courts drop the descriptor “substantial” and replace it with
134
the descriptor “knowing.”
This modification creates a
redundancy of the second element and might signal that less
135
substantial participation might suffice to impose liability. Despite
the absence of the word substantial, courts’ analyses in reviewing
aiding and abetting claims against lawyers have not significantly
changed. These cases do illustrate the semantic problems courts
have with the ambiguous standards.
In determining whether the facts support the existence of a
lawyer’s substantial assistance, courts turn to the factors in
comment d of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876(b)
136
for guidance. The first factor, the nature of the act encouraged,

133. See, e.g., Holmes v. Young, 885 P.2d 305, 309 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). In
Holmes, the court explained that:
The gravamen of a claim of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary
duty is the defendant’s “knowing participation” in the fiduciary’s
breach of trust; wrongful intent is not necessary as the factfinder is
required only to “find that the [defendant] knew of the breach of duty
and participated in it.”
Id. (quoting S & K Sales Co. v. Nike, Inc., 816 F.2d 843, 848 (2d Cir. 1987).
134. See, e.g., Mann v. GTCR Golder Rauner, L.L.C., 483 F. Supp. 2d 864, 878
(D. Ariz. 2007) (holding that a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary
duty requires “(1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship; (2) a breach of that duty;
(3) knowing participation by the non-fiduciary; and (4) damages.” (citations
omitted)). See also Chem-Age Indus., Inc. v. Glover, 652 N.W.2d 756 (S.D. 2002)
(providing that “[l]egal authorities . . . are unanimous in expressing the
proposition that one who knowingly aids another in the breach of a fiduciary duty
is liable to the one harmed thereby.”); Young, 885 P.2d at 308–09 (acknowledging
that a cause of action for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty requires
“(1) breach by a fiduciary of a duty owed to [a] plaintiff, (2) [a] defendant’s
knowing participation in the breach, and (3) damages.”).
135. See Combs, supra note 14, at 267 (describing the changing elements of the
judicial tests).
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d (1979). In pertinent part,
comment d provides the following guidance:
The assistance of or participation by the defendant may be so slight
that he is not liable for the act of the other. In determining this, the
nature of the act encouraged, the amount of assistance given by the
defendant, his presence or absence at the time of the tort, his relation
to the other and his state of mind are all considered. . . . [A]lthough a
person who encourages another to commit a tortious act may be
responsible for other acts by the other, ordinarily he is not liable for
other acts that, although done in connection with the intended
tortious act, were not foreseeable by him.
Id. (internal cross-references omitted).
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is essential to establishing the type of assistance that would matter
137
Since
in terms of furthering the client’s tortious conduct.
breaches of fiduciary duties occur in multiple contexts, breaches
vary. Depending on what is necessary for the breach to occur, a
fiduciary may require some specialized knowledge held by the
lawyer.
The substantial assistance analysis benefits, perhaps, from
evaluating the third element, the amount of the lawyer’s assistance
138
to her client, with the second element, knowledge.
Generally,
where lawyers are involved, neither silence nor inaction meets the
139
threshold of substantial assistance. In addition, some courts have
stated that the performance of ordinary and routine professional
services like drafting documents or even advising clients does not
140
For example, in an analogous
constitute substantial assistance.
context in which an accountant provided services such as preparing
financial statements, setting up accounts, recording conveyances,
and providing tax advice, the court deemed these services as
141
“routine” and therefore not substantial assistance. The analysis of
an accountant’s liability is applicable to lawyers because lawyers and
accountants are similarly situated as professionals owing fiduciary
142
duties to their clients. Moreover, in both professions, a variety of

137. See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 483–84 (noting that in a physical battery case, a
defendant’s “war cry” for continued beating may have contributed to the
assaulter’s rage).
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) cmt. d (1979).
139. See McNulty & Hanson, supra note 49, at 19–20 (stating that “action is a
necessary predicate for substantial assistance” and therefore “silence or inaction is
legally insufficient”).
140. Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman, & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179, 189 (Minn.
1999).
141. Id. (noting that generally professionals performing routine services
should not be held liable for the torts of their clients). But see Thornwood, Inc. v.
Jenner & Block, 799 N.E.2d 756, 768–69 (Ill. Ct. App. 2003) (stating that
communicating the competitive advantages available to the company to other
parties, but specifically not to the plaintiff; reviewing and counseling the plaintiff’s
former partner with regard to the production of investment offering memoranda,
financial projections, and marketing literature, which purposely failed to identify
plaintiff as a partner; and drafting, negotiating, reviewing, and executing
documents, including the releases relating to the purchase of plaintiff’s interest,
may constitute substantial assistance in an aiding and abetting claim).
142. See Malmsteen v. Berdon, LLP, 477 F. Supp. 2d 655, 662 (S.D.N.Y 2007)
(holding that although “[c]ourts do not generally regard the accountant-client
relationship as a fiduciary one, where the allegations include knowledge and
concealment of illegal acts and diversions of funds . . . a [breach of fiduciary duty]
cause of action against an accountant will be permitted to stand.”) (internal
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services are performed, some of which require the professional to
go beyond merely filling out forms.
For the proposition that the performance of routine services is
not substantial assistance, courts often cite to dicta in the
143
Massachusetts case Spinner v. Nutt. In Spinner, the beneficiaries of
a trust alleged that the lawyer’s legal advice to his client, a trustee,
144
induced the trustee’s breach of fiduciary duty.
In refusing to
impose liability on the trustee’s lawyers for aiding and abetting the
trustee’s breach of fiduciary duty, the court stated that legal advice
145
alone was insufficient to hold lawyers liable.
The Spinner court’s
recital of the facts indicates that in advising the trustees, the lawyers
were merely negligent and did not intentionally further the
146
breach.
This distinction is important because it addresses the
limitation on a secondary actor’s liability when acting negligently.
Indeed, it is plausible that Spinner relieves negligent lawyers of
liability but still holds open the possibility of a lawyer’s ordinary
and routine services constituting substantial assistance if
147
intentionally done to aid a client’s breach of fiduciary duty.
3.

Aiding and Abetting in Closely-Held Businesses
a.

Introduction to Squeeze-Outs

The liability of lawyers for aiding and abetting breaches of
fiduciary duties in the contexts described above extends to the
context of closely-held businesses. In contrast to the aiding and
abetting analysis in “plain vanilla” breaches of fiduciary duty, the
aiding and abetting analysis in closely-held businesses is less clear

quotations and citations omitted); CPJ Enterprises, Inc. v. Gernander, 521 N.W.2d
622, 624 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that “[t]he lawyer-client relationship is
jealously guarded and restricted to only those two parties because it is a fiduciary
relationship of the highest character.”).
143. See, e.g., Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 189 (citing Spinner v. Nutt, 631 N.E.2d
542, 546 (Mass. 1994) for the proposition that “substantial assistance” means
something more than routine professional services).
144. Spinner, 631 N.E.2d. at 546.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., Anstine v. Alexander, 128 P.3d 249, 255 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005)
(distinguishing lawyers rendering “professional advice” and defendant lawyer
advising client in how to transfer escrowed insurance premiums “off shore” to
purchase illegal Swiss insurance policies), rev’d on other grounds, 152 P.3d 497
(Colo. 2007).
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due to the unique nature of the duties owed by majority owners.
Proving that the lawyer had actual knowledge of the breach of duty
adds even more complexity to the aiding and abetting analysis.
When entering into a closely-held business, a minority owner
has certain reasonable expectations with regard to ownership and
149
control. By virtue of the majority owner’s position as the majority
interest holder, the majority owner has control of the business. To
protect the minority owner from the majority owner’s abuse of that
control, the majority owner owes the duty not to use his power to
oppress the minority owner by acting contrary to the minority
150
If the majority owner fails to
owner’s reasonable expectations.
adhere to his duty not to oppress, a squeeze-out occurs.
A squeeze-out is essentially a majority owner’s use of control
over the business to eliminate or reduce minority owners’ interests
in the business; a majority owner’s actions are at the expense of a
151
minority owner’s reasonable expectations. Majority owners exert
their control to accomplish a squeeze-out by applying one or
152
several mechanisms.
For example, a majority owner may
terminate a minority owner’s position of employment or use voting
power to weaken a minority owner’s control over business affairs.
Majority owners may also decide to withhold or restrict dividends
153
When a majority owner uses
while increasing their own salaries.
more than one mechanism, squeeze-outs can become complex.

148.
149.
150.
151.

See generally Part III.A.2.
Kleinberger, supra note 73, at 1155–56.
Id. at 1153.
See F. HODGE O’NEAL AND ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL AND THOMPSON’S
OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS § 1.01, at 1–2 (rev. 2d
ed. 2005).
152. See generally Franklin A. Gevurtz, Squeeze-Outs and Freeze-Outs in Limited
Liability Companies, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 497, 517–538 (1995) (examining provisions in
partnership law and corporation law that have promoted or inhibited squeezeouts, and discussing which provisions should be included in limited liability
company statutes to minimize risk of member squeeze-outs).
153. O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 151, §§ 3–5. Other squeeze-out
mechanisms include: siphoning off corporate earnings by leases and loans
favorable to the majority; siphoning off a corporation’s profits by having other
enterprises perform services; fraudulent or unfair contracts; appropriation of
corporate assets, contracts, or credit for personal use; corporation’s purchase of
shares from majority shareholder at a high price; dilution of minority’s interest
through issuance of stock; withholding information; and changing rights through
charter amendments. Id.
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154

Squeeze-outs occur for a variety of reasons.
In general, a
majority owner’s improper motivation lies at the root of
oppression. Improper motivation may arise from dissention among
155
the co-owners of the business. Common types of discord include
156
the co-owners disagreeing on valuing the interest of the shares,
the entry of a minority owner into a competing business, the coowners’ failure to appreciate the problems with a change in
157
control, or the drive of one owner with superior talent to advance
158
in the business.
In addition, oppression may be motivated
159
entirely by a majority owner’s greed or desire for power.
The majority owner’s desire to gain control at the expense of
the minority owner’s reasonable expectations induce some
160
squeeze-outs, but legitimate business purposes motivate others.
Majority owners have a certain degree of latitude to make decisions
in furtherance of their own interests and to act on behalf of the
161
business.
For example in Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co.,
the majority dealt with a derelict minority owner by discharging the
162
minority owner from his position in the business.
The minority
owner filed suit against the business and the majority owner
claiming that the majority owner’s actions constituted

154. See id. § 2.01 at 2 (“The underlying causes of squeeze-outs are not always
clear.”).
155. Id. § 2.02.
156. See id. § 2.16 at 46 (noting that multiple factors will affect the price at
which the majority owners and minority owners value the business).
157. Id. § 2.12 at 32 (stating that because withdrawing owners have usually
acquired a specific skill in the particular business, existing owners frequently see
employment in a similar line of business).
158. Id. § 2.06 at 15 (quoting an anonymous lawyer that “a typical scenario of
this includes: ‘Our client ___ was lazy and dumb. The defendant ___ was energetic
and sharp. There was no fraud involved.’ ”); § 2.06 at 16 (stating that “[i]n the
long run, the capable tend to gain the upper hand” and that “[e]ven in a family
corporation, the dominant business person in the family often eventually pushes
out less able relatives, diminishes their participation, or excludes them from new
opportunities which arise out of the enterprise.”).
159. See, e.g., Goben v. Barry, 676 P.2d 90, 97 (Kan. 1984) (stating that the
owner’s actions including failing to account or divide the property, increasing his
own salary, concealing withdrawals, and denying co-owner’s interest in the
company were motivated “solely [by] monetary gain.”).
160. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 151, § 2.11 at 3.
161. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass.
1976).
162. Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554, 561–62 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1979) (holding that there was no oppressive action toward plaintiff by
controlling owners).
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163

oppression.
The minority owner claimed that he had an
expectation of a management position in the business and that the
164
majority owner’s action infringed on this expectation. The court,
however, found no oppression because the minority owner failed to
“learn the business,” a condition precedent to his employment in
165
the company.
There may be several legitimate reasons why a majority owner
would want to distance himself and the business from the minority
owner. For example, if a minority owner ages and experiences
correlative health issues, his decreased capacity to work could have
166
But regardless of the majority
a harmful effect on the business.
owner’s motive, if the majority owner pursues his self-interest in a
way that is unfair to the minority owner, it is wrongful. If, in
Exadaktilos, the co-owners didn’t agree that the minority owner’s
employment and right to manage was contingent on his satisfactory
performance in the business, the court may have found oppression.
Oppression occurs when proper motivation—a legitimate
167
business purpose—is improperly executed.
For example, in
Royals v. Piedmont Electric Repair Co., the minority owner was
involved in a sexual harassment claim that allegedly caused the
168
After the claim arose, the majority owners
business to suffer.
began the minority owner’s removal by limiting the minority

163. Id. at 554.
164. Id. at 556.
165. Id. at 561–62.
166. See, e.g., Bermann v. Meth, 258 A.2d 521 (Pa. 1969). Here the minority
owner brought a derivative action on behalf of closely-held business against an
owner whose age and ill health caused him to reduce the number of hours each
day he worked. In reviewing the trial court’s decision that the defendant’s salary
constituted corporate waste, the court found that even though the defendant was
not contributing the same amount of time and labor to the corporation as he did
before he became ill, his salary, which was comparable to that of years past, was
not excessive.
167. See, e.g., Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984)
(holding that “actions to date of majority owners with respect to minority [owner ]
essentially excluded from all participation in operation, management, or profits of
the corporation by reason of that owner's alleged dishonest acts were not so
‘oppressive,’ that is, burdensome, harsh, or wrongful, as would warrant dissolution
of the corporation” but that “court had discretion to fashion other appropriate
remedy to protect rights of minority [owner].”).
168. Royals v. Piedmont Elec. Repair Co., 529 S.E.2d 515, 520 (N.C. Ct. App.
2000) (holding that the minority owner’s reasonable expectations were not caused
by his sexual harassment claim but were frustrated by the majority owners’
actions).
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169

owner’s activity in running the business.
The majority then
terminated the minority owner’s employment and withheld
compensation while refusing to buy the minority owner’s shares for
170
anything less than half the book value. In addition, the majority
fired the minority owner’s grandson, Royal, from his position as
171
director. The court, proclaiming North Carolina’s reputation of
being “a pioneer and ‘shining light’ in the protection of minority
172
The
[owner] rights,” found the majority’s conduct oppressive.
minority owner’s reasonable financial and managerial expectations
173
were unrelated to the sexual harassment charge.
The majority’s
actions, therefore, “manifest[ed] an intent to control the company
174
without any minority [owner] or director input.”
b.

Complexity of Squeeze-outs

When the majority owner desires to disguise the oppression of
the minority owner, squeeze-outs become complex. The level of
sophistication needed to avoid an obvious breach of fiduciary duty
requires expertise. The majority owner’s ability to orchestrate
squeeze-outs requires strategy and other technical assistance that
lawyers are well-equipped to provide. An example of strategic
175
complexity is found in Aranki v. Goldman & Associates. In Aranki,
the majority owner’s lawyer assisted the squeeze-out of the minority
owner by initiating a lawsuit, the merits of which were questionable,
176
against the minority owner for theft and conversion. At the same
time, the lawyer advised the majority to place the minority in
177
default of a personal loan between the two parties. The sequence
of events in the squeeze-out was designed to deplete the minority’s
178
funds, leaving him vulnerable to unfair settlement terms.
169. Id. at 517.
170. Id. at 517–18.
171. Id. at 517.
172. Id. (citing Robert Savage McLean, Minority Owners' Rights in the Close
Corporation under the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 68 N.C. L. REV.
1109, 1125–26 (1990)).
173. Id. at 520–21.
174. Id. at 521.
175. 825 N.Y.S.2d 97 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
176. Id. at 511–12.
177. Id.
178. Id. (holding that the complaint set forth facts that would show that the
defendants colluded to freeze plaintiffs out of “company's management and profit
sharing” and “force them to surrender, at reduced price, their minority
membership interest in company” and that the allegations were sufficient to bring
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The need for expertise in accomplishing a squeeze-out is also
evident in the level of technical complexity of squeeze-outs. For
example, in Granewich v. Harding, the majority owner attempted to
179
oust the minority owner by removing him from employment.
When the minority owner challenged the majority’s actions, the
180
majority hired a lawyer to accomplish the squeeze-out.
The
lawyer’s legal expertise, shown by the lawyer advising his clients to
call special meetings, to amend the corporate by-laws, and to issue
stock to dilute the value of the minority’s interest, was essential to
181
the oppression scheme.
c.

Is the Client’s Conduct a Breach of Fiduciary Duty?

In plain vanilla breaches of fiduciary duty, where the
fiduciary’s breach is obvious, a lawyer should have no problem
recognizing that her client’s conduct constitutes a breach. But in
closely-held businesses, a majority owner’s wrongful conduct
toward the minority owner may not be obvious. A minority owner’s
reasonable expectations in a specific business are peculiar to the
agreements made among the owners of the business. Similarly, the
legitimate business purposes of a majority owner are unique and
highly contextual. A minority owner’s reasonable expectations are
often ambiguous, and a majority owner’s actions appearing to
further legitimate business interests, could, in fact, be oppressive.
Unless a majority owner’s breach of fiduciary duty is obvious, it
may be difficult for an “outsider,” a court, or even a lawyer, to
determine whether the actions of the majority owner were
unlawful. A court that addresses oppression, therefore, must
forth a cause of action against the lawyers for aiding and abetting). The strategy
described in the text was detailed in Plaintiffs-Appellant’s brief to the appellate
court. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Aranki v. Goldman & Assoc., LLP, 825
N.Y.S.2d 97 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (No. 2005-11033), 2006 WL 3831020.
179. Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788, 795–96 (Or. 1999) (holding that
attorneys knew and participated in scheme to “squeeze out” minority owner, which
resulted in breach of fiduciary duties of majority owners).
180. Id. at 791. See also Barksdale, supra note 38, at 577–78 (stating that
“[a]ttorneys routinely facilitate corporate squeeze-outs because the close
corporation is a legal entity whose very existence derives from attorney input and
whose rules of governance and procedures are not easily understood by laypersons
. . . . [B]y definition, a squeeze-out involves the controlling shareholder’s
utilization of powers of control and ‘some legal device or technique’ to remove the
minority shareholder from the entity . . . that can only be accomplished by an
attorney with knowledge of the statutory mechanisms authorizing such action.”)
181. Granewich, 985 P.2d at 791–92.
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scrutinize the facts to determine the minority owner’s reasonable
182
expectations, and whether the majority owner, in pursuing a
legitimate purpose, adequately yielded to those reasonable
expectations—that is, whether the “same legitimate objective could
have been achieved through an alternative course of action less
183
harmful to the minority’s interest.”
This determination
necessarily precedes the aiding and abetting issue.
An example of a situation where a majority owner’s actions
against a minority owner seemed legitimate, but in fact constituted
184
a squeeze-out, is found in Leslie v. Boston Software Collaborative.
Leslie involved a software repair business that was owned and
185
operated by the plaintiff minority owner and two other owners.
Upon the business’s inception, each owner emphasized a different
area in running the business and had some degree of technical
186
All of the owners were employees, and to a certain
proficiency.
degree their salaries reflected the amount of income each
187
generated by servicing the business’s clients.
The minority owner conflicted with the majority over various
188
issues, including the compensation scheme.
In addition, the
minority owner was the subject of numerous employee and client
189
complaints.
The majority owners’ dissatisfaction with the
minority owner culminated after reading a threatening e-mail from

182. See Royals v. Piedmont Electric Repair Co., 529 S.E.2d 515, 519 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2000) (citing Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563 (N.C. 1983)
(stating that “a complaining owner's reasonable expectations cannot be viewed in
a vacuum; rather they must be examined and re-evaluated over the entire course
of the various participants' relationships and dealings.”)).
183. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass.
1976) (“The majority, concededly, have certain rights to what has been termed
‘selfish ownership’ in the corporation which should be balanced against the
concept of their fiduciary obligation to the minority.”). See, e.g., Bermann v. Meth,
258 A.2d 521, 523–24 (Pa. 1969) (upholding owner’s reasonable expectations of
compensation and concluding that even though the ailing the owner’s ability to
work had decreased, the wages given to the ailing owner was not corporate waste).
184. No. 10268BLS, 2002 WL 532605 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 2002)
(reviewing minority owner’s claim of squeeze-out).
185. Id. at *1.
186. Id.
187. Id. at *2 (stating that the business was run similarly to a law firm, with the
owners generating “billable hours” when directly servicing clients).
188. At one point, the owners decided on a compensation scheme that evened
out the owners’ salaries. But the arrangement did not last long as the majority
owners wanted their hard work, which was apparently disproportionate to the
minority owner’s efforts, to be adequately compensated. Id.
189. Id. at *2–3.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss3/1

34

Eid: Lawyer Liability for Aiding and Abetting Squeez-Outs
6. EID - ADC

4/23/2008 7:40:03 PM

2008]

LAWYER LIABILITY

1211

190

the minority owner.
In dealing with the problematic minority
owner, the majority owners placed the minority owner on leave and
191
attempted to negotiate the minority owner’s termination.
Unable to reach an agreement, the majority fired the minority
owner, voted him out of his position as director, and voted to
192
eliminate dividends and replace them with employee bonuses.
In reviewing the minority owner’s squeeze-out claim, the court
found that the decision to oust the minority owner as a director
193
and to fire him was contrary to his reasonable expectations.
Although the majority may have had a legitimate business purpose,
there were less harmful alternatives available to pursue their
purpose, including modifying the minority owner’s job duties,
upgrading his skills through education, and searching for a more
194
Although
“creative compensation” structure to meet his needs.
the court did not order the minority owner’s reinstatement as an
employee, the court directed that the minority owner receive eight
months of severance pay and that he be reinstated as a director to
195
protect his investment in the company.
As shown in Leslie, a
majority owner’s conduct that seems justified may still constitute
196
oppression.
Even after scrutinizing the facts, reasonable minds may differ
as to whether the majority’s actions constitute oppression. For

190. Id. at *3–4. In the e-mail, the minority owner stated that his wife reserved
the right to "shoot" one of the majority owners. The minority owner was licensed
to carry a gun and occasionally kept a gun in the office.
191. Id. at *4.
192. Id. at *5–6.
193. Id. at *8.
194. Id.
195. Id. at *9.
196. See, e.g., Pooley v. Mankato Iron & Metal, Inc., 513 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1994) (reviewing minority owner’s appeal of lower court’s valuation of
minority owner’s shares in buyout). In Pooley, three brothers owned and shared
equal interest in a closely-held corporation. One of the brothers began to behave
in a manner that was destructive to the business. Id. at 836. During a special
owner’s meeting, two of the brothers constituting the majority voted the
belligerent brother out as a director. Id. The brother, as the minority owner,
brought suit against the majority. Id. The trial court concluded that despite the
minority owner’s conduct, the majority owners deprived him of his reasonable
expectation to participate in the management of the business. Id. Though
limiting the minority owner’s exposure to patrons of the business may have been a
legitimate business purpose, the majority could have accomplished this in a
different manner. The trial court’s determination that the majority owners acted
prejudicially by freezing the minority owner out of the business was not appealed.
Id.
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example, in Landstrom v. Shaver, the minority owner’s views
regarding how the corporation should be run clashed with those
197
views of the majority owners.
The minority owner sued the
198
Prevailing in the lower
majority owners, alleging oppression.
court, the minority owner claimed that the majority was frustrating
199
her reasonable expectation to manage the business.
In reviewing
the majority owner’s conduct, which included not updating an
accounting system, the court stated that the minority owner’s
problem with the business arose out the fact that she was outvoted
200
Shaver shows how reasonable
and disappointed, not oppressed.
minds may differ as to what constitutes a breach of a fiduciary duty
in the context of closely-held businesses.
The intent of a majority owner to oppress a minority owner is
also found where a majority owner uses abusive conduct to coerce a
minority owner into giving into its demands. In Evans v. Blesi, the
minority owner, Blesi, and the majority owner, Evans, had been
201
sole owners of their company for nearly three decades.
When
Blesi began having health problems, Evans expressed his concern
202
that Blesi’s health may have adverse effects on the business. Using
concern over Blesi’s health problems as a purportedly legitimate
business purpose, Evans made threats, including threatening to
dissolve and liquidate the business to persuade Blesi to transfer his
203
shares of the business and resign. Succumbing to Evans’s tactics,

197. Landstrom v. Shaver, 561 N.W.2d 1, 9–10 (S.D. 1997) (holding that a
showing that the minority owner had been outvoted and was subjectively
disappointed with corporate management was insufficient to constitute
oppression).
198. Id. at 2.
199. Id. at 10 (quoting the trial court, “[d]efendants' respective efforts in
directing the Company, failure to pay adequate attention to safety concerns,
deception in obtaining Landstrom's signature to the 1987 Revision, refusal to deal
on a good faith basis with her attempts to sell her stock, disdain for her desire to
treat employees decently, animosity toward her that they have exhibited during
this litigation, and continued actions at annual owner meetings designed to
prevent her from meaningfully participating in the Company, all constitute facts
from which this Court concludes [majority owners] oppressed [minority
owner].”).
200. Id. at 11–12.
201. Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that
evidence was sufficient to support allegation that the majority owner breached his
fiduciary duty to the minority owner by getting the minority owner to resign).
202. Id. at 778.
203. Id.
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204

Blesi transferred the shares.
The court found that Evans’s
conduct toward Blesi fell short of the “highest standards of integrity
and good faith” that owners in closely-held businesses owe to each
205
other.
Though this case involved flagrantly offensive conduct that
obviously constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty, situations arise in
which majority owners act quite diplomatically in oppressing
minority owners, and breaches of fiduciary duty are not always
clear. When aiding and abetting claims are brought against lawyers
in these ambiguous cases, courts face another challenging
determination: whether a lawyer had actual knowledge of her
client’s breach of fiduciary duty.
IV. FINDING A SOLUTION
Trust is an “essential component of successful long term
206
In closely-held businesses lies an
business relationship[s].”
inequity of bargaining power. As such, there is a need to prevent a
majority owner’s exploitation of a powerless minority trapped in an
207
Indeed, where co-owners owe
undesirable business relationship.
208
each other the duty of the utmost good faith and loyalty, lawyers
should not be allowed to perpetuate the dishonesty of majority
209
owners by subverting the fiduciary relationship.

204. Id. at 779–80 (noting that Evans’s secret preparation, including meeting
with lawyers and preparing documents, was a part of a string of intimidating
tactics, in violation of fiduciary duty to minority owner).
205. Id. at 779.
206. Robert W. Hillman, Business Partners as Fiduciaries: Reflections on the Limits
of the Doctrine, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 51, 55 (2000). See also id. n.15 (noting that
fiduciary duties are necessary “to afford adequate protection to minority owners
and particularly to those in closely held corporations whose disadvantageous and
often precarious position renders them particularly vulnerable to the vagaries of
the majority.”) (quoting Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 473 (Cal.
1963)).
207. See Hillman, supra note 206, at 55 n.14 (noting Professor Vestal’s
explanation that “[b]y joining the partnership, each partner agrees to advance the
collective interest and not the short term individual interest of the partner. This is
not abjuration of self-interest . . . individuals elect to join a partnership because
they calculate that they will maximize their individual long-term interest through
the collective enterprise.”).
208. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975).
209. See Barksdale, supra note 38, at 58 (examining the role of lawyers in
squeeze-outs and emphasizing the need to protect the “sanctity of the close
corporation fiduciary relationship” by imposing liability onto lawyers who aid and
abet squeeze-outs).
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Cutting the opposite direction of the fiduciary duties that coowners owe each other is a strong argument in favor of upholding
the trust and confidence in the lawyer-client relationship at the
expense of other fiduciary relationships.
[F]or individuals and corporations to obtain the advice
and assistance that they must receive from their agents,
the agents must have some protection from tort liability to
third parties-assists us in determining the rule that should
be applied in this case . . . [S]afeguarding the lawyer-client
relationship protects more than just an individual or
entity in any particular case or transaction; it is integral to
210
the protection of the legal system itself.
When lawyers fear liability in performing their normal
professional duties, such as advising their clients in pursuing
legitimate business purposes, it may be difficult for businesses to
find skilled lawyers whose services are affordable. This potential
chilling effect would greatly impact closely-held businesses since
many of these businesses have limited resources. For instance, in
some jurisdictions, minority owners in closely-held businesses may
211
bring actions directly instead of derivatively. This opens the door
to the potential of minority owners’ abuse of majority owners.
Small businesses that are ill-equipped to deal with the cost of
212
litigation are easily influenced to settle.
Moreover, majority
owners who want to pursue legitimate businesses purposes may
have difficulty in finding an affordable lawyer if the lawyer fears
minority owner aiding and abetting suits.
Although lawyers of majority owners are probably not in
imminent danger of a surge of aiding and abetting lawsuits, there is
a need for a rule that “works”: a rule that both imposes
consequences onto those lawyers who knowingly provide
substantial assistance to their clients in oppressing minority owners
and shields from liability honest lawyers who are merely trying to

210. Reynolds v. Schrock, 142 P.3d 1062, 1067 (Or. 2006) (declining to impose
liability onto a lawyer for assisting a client’s breach of fiduciary duty).
211. Daniel S. Kleinberger & Imanta Bergmanis, Direct vs. Derivative, or What's a
Lawsuit Between Friends in an “Incorporated Partnership”, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1203, 1265 n.315 (1996).
212. See Landstrom v. Shaver, 561 N.W.2d 1, 13 (S.D. 1997) (examining the
ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance § 701 and declining to take ALI’s
approach of allowing all claims of owners in closely-held corporations to be
brought directly instead of derivatively because of the large number of small, illprepared business in the state).
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assist their clients in furthering legitimate business purposes. In
addition, the rule must give lawyers the latitude to advise clients
and concurrently prevent lawyers from being the necessary
handmaidens to their clients’ squeeze-outs. These objectives are
sensitive to the need of preserving the trust and confidence that lie
at the core of both the lawyer-client relationship and the
relationships of owners in closely-held businesses.
A. Approaches
Approaches to imposing liability onto lawyers vary by state.
Some approaches are over-inclusive, in that they leave innocent
lawyers vulnerable to minority owner actions of aiding and abetting
oppression. In contrast, some approaches are under-inclusive
because they fail to hold liable lawyers who knowingly assist their
clients’ oppressive conduct. This section surveys the approaches of
Oregon, California, and Minnesota and shows how they fail to
adequately address the fundamental problem in lawyer aiding and
abetting analyses: knowledge of the squeeze-out. Finally, this
section ends with a solution: a rule that enables minority owners’
meritorious actions against lawyers to go forward but prevents
innocent lawyers from being forced into litigation.
1.

Oregon’s Approach: Agent’s Immunity Theory
213

The recent Oregon case Reynolds v. Shrock presents a strong
case for upholding the lawyer-client relationship at the expense of
other fiduciary relationships. Reynolds arose from some peculiar
circumstances.
The parties involved included Reynolds, a
214
Together, the
naturopath, and Schrock, his former patient.
parties had invested in two parcels of real estate: a “lodge” property
215
and a “timber” property.
At one point, some sexual
improprieties occurred between the two parties and Schrock sued
216
Reynolds.

213. 142 P.3d 1062 (Or. 2006).
214. Reynolds v. Schrock, 107 P.3d 52, 54 (Or. Ct. App. 2005).
215. Reynolds, 142 P.3d at 1063.
216. Reynolds, 107 P.3d at 54. Initially, a dispute over the land occurred, and
Schrock sued Reynolds. Id. Schrock then brought a separate suit for “alleged
sexual impropriety stemming from the provider-patient relationship.” Id. The
cases were soon consolidated. Id.
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The parties settled the lawsuit; part of the settlement included
217
Reynolds
restructuring the ownership of the joint investment.
agreed to convey his interest in the recreational property to
Schrock in return for a security interest in the timber property
until the timber was sold, at which time Reynolds would obtain the
profits of the timber sale, retaining no further interest in either
218
parcel so long as he received at least $500,000.
After the settlement, Schrock’s lawyer advised her that she
could sell the recreational parcel of land before the timber was
219
The settlement agreement did not require Schrock to
sold.
retain the property to secure the possible deficiency in the sale of
220
the timber.
The lawyer then assisted Schrock in selling the
recreational parcel and attempted to hide the sale from Reynolds
221
by telling the escrow agent not to notify Reynolds of the sale.
When Reynolds uncovered the transaction, he sued Schrock and
her lawyer for breach of fiduciary duty claiming that the settlement
agreement created a relationship with Schrock that was akin to a
joint venture and that Schrock’s actions constituted a breach of the
222
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
By the time the Oregon Supreme Court granted certiorari,
Schrock had settled with Reynolds, leaving the lawyer as the
223
For the purpose of reviewing the lawyer’s
remaining defendant.
liability, the parties treated the claim for breach of fiduciary duty
and the claim for breach of the covenant of good faith, as a single
224
claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
Both Reynolds and the Oregon Court of Appeals cited a then
225
recent Oregon Supreme Court case, Granewich v. Harding, for the
proposition that a lawyer who knowingly and substantially assists
her client in breaching a fiduciary duty will be held liable for that
217. Reynolds, 142 P.3d at 1063–64.
218. Id. Under the agreement, Schrock was required to pay the difference if
the timber sold for less than $500,000 or Reynolds’s security interest in the
property would remain. Id. at 1063.
219. Id. at 1064.
220. Reynolds, 107 P.3d at 54.
221. Id. Interestingly, after the sale the lawyer received $135,111.71 in fees and
Schrock received $209,440.68. Id.
222. Reynolds, 142 P.3d at 1064.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. 985 P.2d 788 (Or. 1999) (describing the elements required to hold lawyer
who assists majority owner in squeezing-out minority owner liable for aiding and
abetting breach of fiduciary duty).
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breach; an initial read of Granewich seems to support that
226
On review, however, the Oregon Supreme Court
conclusion.
distinguished Granewich and held that in the case at bar, the lawyer
was not liable because he was acting within the scope of
227
In explaining this analysis, the court stated that
representation.
the lawyer did not do anything that was contrary to the settlement
agreement, and that the lawyer was otherwise acting within the
228
In its decision, the court specifically
scope of representation.
included “assisting the client in conduct that breaches the client’s
fiduciary duty to a third party” as within the scope of the lawyer’s
229
representation.
In Reynolds, the privilege that Oregon granted the lawyer is an
extension of the immunity accorded to agents acting on behalf of
their principals; however, the privilege is misplaced in an analysis of
230
a lawyer’s liability for assisting a client’s breach of fiduciary duty.
The agency privilege is an affirmative defense that relieves an agent
who commits a tortious act from liability if she “exercise[es] a
privilege held by the principal or if [she] [acts] for the protection
231
As Reynolds noted, a number of
of the principal’s interests.”
jurisdictions afford lawyers a qualified privilege when advising a

226. Reynolds, 107 P.3d at 52, 58 n.4 (“[an] attorney may not ‘use his license to
practice law as a shield to protect himself from the consequences of his
participation in an unlawful . . . conspiracy’ and that policy ‘should prevent an
attorney from escaping liability for knowingly and substantially assisting a client in
the commission of a tort.’”) (quoting Thornwood, Inc. v. Jenner & Block, 799
N.E.2d 756, 767–69 (Ill. Ct. App. 2003)).
227. Reynolds, 142 P.3d at 1070–72 (“[T]he purpose of privilege requires that
lawyers be able to assess the legal problems that their clients bring to them and
discuss the full range of options . . . lawyers must be able to assist their clients in
implementing those solutions, to the extent that that assistance falls within the
legitimate scope of the lawyer-client relationship.”).
228. Id. at 1071.
229. Id. at 1069.
230. Id. at 1068–70 (applying the agency theory of liability).
231. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 343 (1979). See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 890 (1979) (“One who otherwise would be liable for a tort is
not if he acts in pursuance of and within the limits of a privilege of his own or of a
privilege of another that was properly delegated to him.”). See, e.g, Los Angeles
Airways, Inc. v. Davis, 687 F.2d 321, 328 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying privilege to
corporation’s lawyer in claim against lawyer for inducing corporation’s contract
with third party); Hussie v. Bressler, 504 N.Y.S.2d 510, 511 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)
(stating that “it is well settled that ‘[a]n agent cannot be held liable for inducing
his principal to breach a contract with a third person, at least where he is acting on
behalf of his principal and within the scope of his authority.’” (quoting Kartiganer
Assoc. v. Town of New Windsor, 485 N.Y.S.2d 782 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985))).
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client amounts to an interference with that client’s contractual
232
relations with a third party.
Although at first glance this case is about a property
transaction, their relationship was similar to a joint venture and
Schrock breached her fiduciary duty to Reynolds. Regardless of
whether the contract failed to include a provision prohibiting
Schrock from selling the recreational parcel, Reynolds had a
reasonable expectation that the defendant would not sell it.
Similarly, minority owners may have reasonable expectations that
are not found in a document. Therefore, the failure of the court to
impose liability on the lawyer for aiding and abetting his client’s
breach may have adverse consequences in the context of
oppression in closely-held businesses.
233
In Schott v. Glover, the Illinois Court of Appeals provided a
good analysis of the need to limit lawyers’ liability arising from
advising their clients to breach contracts. The plaintiff, a realty
agency, alleged that Glover, the lawyer representing a bank, had
caused his client to breach an exclusive agency contract that the
234
realty agency had with the bank.
In addressing the potential
liability of lawyers for tortious interference with contractual
relations, the court stated that a “privilege occurs where the third

232. Reynolds, 142 P.3d at 1070. See also Maness v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 7 F.3d
704, 709 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that in addition to employee’s failure to establish
basic elements of tortious interference, “an attorney who acts within the scope of
the attorney-client relationship will not be liable to third persons for actions
arising out of his professional relationship unless the attorney exceeds the scope
of his employment or acts for personal gain”); Macke Laundry Serv. Ltd. P’ship v.
Jetz Serv. Co., 931 S.W.2d 166, 181–82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing that
lawyers are accorded a qualified privilege, when acting within the scope of
attorney-client privilege to advise and act for a client even though that advice may
cause a client not to perform a contract); Burger v. Brookhaven Med. Arts Bldg.,
516 N.Y.S.2d 705 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (stating that "an attorney is not liable for
inducing his principal [client] to breach a contract with a third person, at least
where he is acting on behalf of his principal within the scope of his authority,” and
that “[a]bsent a showing of fraud or collusion, or of a malicious or tortious act, an
attorney is not liable to third parties for purported injuries caused by services
performed on behalf of a client or advice offered to that client"); Schott v. Glover,
440 N.E.2d 376, 380 (Ill. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a plaintiff can state a cause
of action for tortious interference with a contract against a lawyer if the plaintiff
can set forth factual allegations showing actual malice, and stating that “[s]uch
allegations, however, would necessarily include a desire to harm, which is
independent of and unrelated to the attorney's desire to protect his client.”).
233. Schott, 440 N.E.2d at 380 (holding that plaintiffs failed to establish a claim
against bank’s attorney for tortious interference with contractual relations).
234. Id. at 377.
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party acts [to] protect a conflicting interest which is considered to
be of equal or greater value than that accorded to the contractual
235
rights involved.”
The court recognized that the fiduciary
relationship between a lawyer and client was one that necessitated
this privilege: not imposing privilege would have the effect of
creating a duty to third parties, and “[p]ublic policy requires that
an attorney, when acting in his professional capacity, be free to
236
advise his client.”
The application of the agent’s privilege in the context of
237
tortious interference with contractual relations is warranted. But,
in making the decision to hold the lawyer-client relationship
superior to the joint venture relationship, the Reynolds court
improperly analogizes contractual relationships to fiduciary
relationships. There is a vast difference between fiduciaries and
contracting parties.
First, as a matter of form, the underlying acts that the lawyer
assists are different. In aiding and abetting, a breach of loyalty has
238
been compared to an intentional tort; however, the underlying
conduct of an action for tortious interference with contractual
239
relations is a breach of contract. A client has the right to breach
a contract without incurring liability in tort. Thus, the client’s
privilege to breach extends to the lawyer. In contrast, a fiduciary
does not have the privilege to breach the duty of loyalty.
Second, as a matter of substance, the inter se relationships of
the parties are substantially different. Contracting parties are
dealing at arm’s length, whereas fiduciaries in closely-held
businesses owe each other trust and confidence—the utmost honor

235. Id. at 379.
236. Id.
237. Id. (stating that holding lawyers liable for tortuous interference with
contractual relations would cause lawyers to owe duties to third parties dealing at
arm’s length and that duties to third parties would jeopardize fiduciary
relationships between lawyer and client).
238. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 874 cmt. b (1979) (“A fiduciary who
commits a breach of his duty as a fiduciary is guilty of tortious conduct to the
person for whom he should act.”).
239. See Maness v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 7 F.3d 704, 709 (8th Cir. 1993) (setting
forth the elements of tortious interference with contractual relations as including:
“1) the existence of a contract, 2) the alleged wrongdoer’s knowledge of the
contract, 3) the intentional procurement of a breach, 4) the alleged wrongdoer
acting without justification, and 5) damages.” (citations omitted)).
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240

and loyalty.
Therefore, fiduciaries must resist acting in a purely
self-serving manner.
Third, the sources of the duties are different. Contractual
obligations are created by contract terms and are owed to the
parties of that contract, but fiduciary relationships are created by
241
law and by social policy.
Fourth, contracts and fiduciary duties serve different
functions. “[T]he purpose of contract law is not to deter the
breach, but . . . to require the breaching party to internalize the
242
costs of the breach.” A contract may even be considered a set of
alternative promises: the obligor promises that he will perform his
end of the bargain or that he will compensate the loss of the
243
benefit to the obligee if he breaches.
In closely-held businesses,
reasonable expectations formed from the trust and loyalty among
the owners comprises the duties owed. Although a court is able to
put a value on a minority owner’s reasonable expectations, it may
not replace the minority owner’s subjective view of what he lost.
There are legitimate reasons why parties need to or should
break contracts. Indeed, “efficient breaches” are even encouraged
244
The “immunity” solution offered by the
by some economists.
Reynolds court furthers the important objective of maintaining
confidentiality and candor between the client and lawyer. Breach
of contract is not necessarily “wrongful” enough to bar lawyer-client
privilege. Though barring lawyers from liability for tortious
interference with contractual relations is supported by good policy,
these policies do not easily transfer to the context of closely-held
entities, where oppression is deemed unacceptable; a breach of
240. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
st
241. See Carl A. Pierce, Client Misconduct in the 21 Century, 35 U. MEM. L. REV.
731, 895, 895–99 (2005) (providing that fiduciary duties vary depending on the
context in which they arise and that, some jurisdictions allow certain fiduciary
duties to be contracted out of the business agreement; this further emphasizes that
fiduciary duties are imposed by law, both by statute and by common law).
242. Id. at 900.
243. Id. See also L.L. Cole & Son, Inc. v. Hickman, 665 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Ark.
1984) (“The law has long recognized the view that a contracting party has the
option to breach a contract and pay damages if it is more efficient to do so.”).
244. See Thyssen, Inc. v. S.S. Fortune Star, 777 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1985)
(analyzing whether punitive damages should be awarded to the plaintiff for the
defendant’s breach of contract and noting that “[an] explanation, offered by
economists, is the notion that breaches of contract that are in fact efficient and
wealth-enhancing should be encouraged, and that such ‘efficient breaches’ occur
when the breaching party will still profit after compensating the other party for its
‘expectation interest.’”).
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fiduciary duty is not a violation of a mere agreement, but a
violation of trust.
2.

California’s Approach: Gatekeeping Statute

California case law is nearly devoid of aiding and abetting
245
Although courts recognize the difference
claims against lawyers.
between aiding and abetting and conspiracy, attacks on lawyers for
assisting their clients’ wrongful conduct take the form of conspiracy
246
In deciding lawyer liability cases under conspiracy law,
claims.
California narrows the scope of a lawyer’s liability in assisting a
client’s breach of fiduciary duty to situations in which the lawyer
owes an independent duty to the aggrieved third party or the
lawyer acts of outside the scope of representation by deriving a
247
financial benefit from the client’s breach. The policy supporting
this is the theory that for one to be liable for conspiring to breach a
248
fiduciary duty, that person must owe a duty to breach.
A lawyer,
therefore, cannot conspire with her client to breach a fiduciary
duty owed to a third party unless that lawyer directly owes a
fiduciary duty.

245. See Barksdale, supra note 38, at 591–96 (examining California’s extensive
history of lawyer liability for assisting client’s in breaching fiduciary duties).
246. See Berg & Berg Enters. v. Sherwood Partners, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 325, 340
n.10 (Ct. App. 2005) (“Despite some conceptual similarities, civil liability for
aiding and abetting the commission of a tort, which has no overlaid requirement
of an independent duty, differs fundamentally from liability based on conspiracy
to commit a tort.”). But see Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101,
1126 (C.D. 2003) (stating that the bulk of California’s leading case law involving a
person’s liability for participating in another’s breach of duty arises in the context
of trusts and that “the cases do not clearly distinguish between claims for breach of
fiduciary duty, conspiracy to breach a fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting the
breach of fiduciary duty.”).
247. See Doctors’ Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 260 Cal. Rptr.
183, 186 (1989) (stating that action for civil conspiracy may not arise if alleged
conspirator is not bound by duty to third party and acts as agent of person who
owes a duty to third party and holding that lawyers for medical malpractice insurer
could not be held liable for damages to plaintiff because lawyers were acting as an
agent of insurer and did not act for their own advantage). See also Everest
Investors 8 v. Whitehall Real Estate Ltd. P’ship. XI, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 297, 300–02
(Ct. App. 2002) (holding that third party who owed no direct fiduciary to plaintiff
could not be held liable for conspiracy); City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329, 342 n.14 (Ct. App. 1998) (noting
that “[a]s a general rule, a cause of action for civil conspiracy will not arise if the
alleged coconspirator, even though a participant in some agreement underlying
the injury, was not personally bound by any duty violated by the wrongdoing.”).
248. Doctors’ Co., 260 Cal. Rptr.’ at 186.
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An example of the judiciary’s general aversion to imposing
liability on lawyers is found in Skarbrevik v. Cohn, England &
249
Whitfield.
In Skarbrevik, the lawyer for a closely-held business
assisted the majority owners’ squeeze-out of a minority owner by
advising the majority to hold a special shareholder’s meeting
during which they could amend the by-laws and to issue additional
stock to the majority owners thereby diluting the minority owner’s
250
The majority owners did not heed the
interest in the business.
lawyer’s advice and took action that was unauthorized by the by251
laws.
The lawyer covered-up his clients’ noncompliance by
memorializing a meeting that never in fact happened and by filing
252
the requisite documents with the Secretary of State.
Despite the
lawyer’s conduct, the court declined to impose liability onto the
lawyer because the lawyer neither owed a duty to the minority
owner nor did the lawyer receive any financial benefit from
253
Although the minority owner did not
assisting the majority.
allege aiding and abetting, the seemingly bizarre outcome most
254
likely would have been the same; California limits the legal
obligations that lawyers owe to non-clients in a squeeze-out by
emphasizing the lawyer’s role as an agent of the client, a position
255
that fundamentally differs from other jurisdictions.
California’s restrictive approach to lawyer liability is further
shown in California’s statutory law. California Civil Code section
249. 282 Cal. Rptr. 627 (Ct. App. 1991).
250. Id. at 631 (reviewing the contents of a letter written by the lawyer in which
the lawyer acknowledged that the “stock dilution plan was complicated and would
take a longer period of time than envisioned”). The majority’s reason for wanting
to rid the business of the minority owner was that they “‘were unhappy with [him]
and they could not afford to keep [him] on the books.’” Id. at 630.
251. See id. at 632.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 640.
254. Barksdale, supra note 38, at 591–600 (commenting on Skarbrevik in light
of California’s history of limiting liability of lawyers).
255. Compare Skarbrevik, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 638 (stating that the California
Supreme Court in Doctors’ reaffirmed the rule that “a cause of action for
conspiracy may not arise when the ‘[lawyer], though a participant in the
agreement underlying the injury, was not personally bound by the duty violated by
the wrongdoing and was acting only as the agent or employee of the party who did
have a duty.’”) with Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman, & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179, 187
(Minn. 1999) (stating that “we are not convinced that public policy requires a
wholesale exclusion of professionals from aiding and abetting” and that “[t]o
grant professionals such immunity would conceivably give them free reign to
provide any assistance short of fraud in helping clients engage in conduct the
professionals know to be tortious.”).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss3/1

46

Eid: Lawyer Liability for Aiding and Abetting Squeez-Outs
6. EID - ADC

2008]

4/23/2008 7:40:03 PM

LAWYER LIABILITY

1223

1714.10 addresses the claims that third parties may bring against
lawyers for conspiring with their clients in committing a tortious
256
act.
Section 1714.10 is deemed the “gate-keeping statute,” as it
filters claims against lawyers from being included in the
257
Before filing a complaint against a lawyer for
complaint.
conspiring with a client, the plaintiff must commence a special
proceeding by filing a verified petition alleging liability along with
supporting affidavits that contain the facts upon which the
258
plaintiff’s claim is based.
The lawyer against whom the claim is
alleged can combat the plaintiff’s allegation by submitting
259
If the court finds that the petition and the
opposing affidavits.
affidavits show a reasonable probability of the plaintiff succeeding
in the action, the court will allow the allegation into the
260
complaint.
California’s gatekeeping approach may be applied to the
261
aiding and abetting oppression context. Requiring the aggrieved
owners to submit to a pre-filing process commands the need for
strong facts that support the allegations. The petition aids the
court in determining whether there is a “reasonable probability
that the party will prevail in the action” or whether the claim is
262
unmeritorious. But these claims would most likely be disposed of
on summary judgment. As such, a gatekeeping statute may prevent
the lawyer from becoming deeply intertwined in the owners’
litigation, a desirable effect in its own right. But a pre-pleading
requirement would do nothing to help the fact-finder determine
whether a squeeze-out constituted a legitimate business purpose or

256. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.10 (West 2007).
257. See Berg & Berg Enters. v. Sherwood Partners, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 325, 329
(Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that section 1714.10 is a gatekeeping statute).
258. See § 1714.10(a).
259. Id.
260. Id. See also Berg & Berg Enters. v. Sherwood Partners, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d
325, 334 (“As originally enacted, the [§ 1714.10] prohibited a complaint from
including a cause of action against an attorney based on a civil conspiracy with his
or her client, except upon a court finding that the plaintiff had demonstrated a
reasonable probability of prevailing.”).
261. See Sherwood Partners, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 340 n.10 (stating that “[e]ven
though aiding and abetting . . . does not generally require that the defendant owe
an independent duty, we believe that as pleaded against an attorney for conduct
arising from the representation of a client, and depending on the particular
allegations, this tort would still fall within the ambit of section 1710.10 and would
thus be subject to is requirements and exceptions.”).
262. See § 1714.10(a).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008

47

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 1
6. EID - ADC

4/23/2008 7:40:03 PM

1224

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:3

oppression, and if so, whether the lawyer had actual knowledge of
the oppression.
Interestingly, an unintentional effect of California case law on
section 1714.10 highlights California’s reluctance to recognize
lawyer liability for aiding and abetting client breaches of fiduciary
duty. When section 1714.10 is read in light of California case law, it
263
California courts only impose liability onto
is rendered null.
lawyers where the lawyer directly owes a duty to the plaintiff or
264
where the lawyer is acting in her own self-interest.
Section
1714.10 excludes from its scope conspiracy claims against lawyers
where the plaintiff alleges that “(1) the [lawyer] has an
independent legal duty to the plaintiff, or (2) the [lawyer’s] acts go
beyond the performance of a professional duty to serve the client
and involve a conspiracy to violate a legal duty in furtherance of the
265
Essentially, there are no viable
[lawyer’s] financial gain.”
conspiracy actions to which the gatekeeping statute applies because
the actions that are removed from the ambit of section 1714.10 are
266
the only actions in which courts recognize lawyer liability.
3.

Minnesota’s Approach: Pleading with Particularity

In Minnesota, courts use an elevated pleading standard when
reviewing claims against lawyers and other professionals for aiding
and abetting. The elevated pleading standard arose in Witzman v.
Lehrman, Lehrman & Flom, an aiding and abetting breach of
267
fiduciary duty case brought against an accountant.
The court in
Witzman equated accountants with other professionals, such as
268
lawyers, for the purpose of imposing aiding and abetting liability.
In reviewing the plaintiff’s claim, the court stated,
If professionals have reason to believe that they may be
held liable for their clients’ torts merely by providing
routine professional services to their clients, the
263. See Pavicich v. Santucci, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 125, 134–35 (Ct. App. 2000)
(reviewing owner’s claim against co-owner and co-owner’s lawyer for conspiracy
and holding that there is no viable conspiracy claim to which section 1714.10
applies).
264. See id. at 135.
265. § 1714.10(c).
266. See Santucci, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 134–35.
267. 601 N.W.2d 179, 186 (Minn. 1999) (evaluating issue of first impression
for professional’s liability under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 876 (1979) for
aiding and abetting a client’s breach of fiduciary duty).
268. Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 186.
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professionals may face a conflict between serving their
clients and protecting their own interests. Thus, applying
aiding and abetting liability to professionals has the
potential to undermine the trust essential to any
269
professional-client relationship.
In reconciling the court’s reluctance to expose lawyers to
plaintiffs’ aiding and abetting claims, the court stated that in aiding
and abetting claims against professionals, the court will “narrowly
and strictly interpret the elements of the claims and require the
plaintiff to plead with particularity facts establishing each of these
270
elements.” Interestingly, after the court heightened the pleading
requirement for allegations against professionals for aiding and
abetting, it strayed from the prevailing actual knowledge standard
and stated that the requisite degree of knowledge necessary to
impose liability on a professional for aiding and abetting a breach
271
of fiduciary duty depends on the circumstances of each case.
In its decision, the Witzman court expressed the policy
concerns that were expressed in the California and Oregon cases.
Having a similar effect to a gatekeeping statute, pleading with
particularity weeds out meritless claims that are not based on facts,
but it also stops some meritorious claims from reaching the purview
of the court. The problem with the pleading standard is that it fails
to address what facts will give rise to a finding of actual knowledge.
As discussed above, squeeze-out cases often involve technical and
strategic complexity.
As with the court’s determination of
oppression, when analyzed in hindsight, aiding and abetting
oppression may be found by deconstructing the scheme that gave
rise to the minority owner’s complaint. A complaint with wellpleaded facts may not give the reviewing court sufficient insight
into the lawyer’s involvement in the scheme.
B. Creating a Rule
The approaches described above work well in jurisdictions that
have decided as a matter of policy to subordinate the fiduciary
relationships between co-owners to the relationships between
lawyers and their clients. Restricting the liability of lawyers for their
269. Id.
270. Id. at 187.
271. Id. at 188 (stating that a professional’s long-term or in-depth relationship
with defendant may suffice to lower the standard of knowledge to constructive
knowledge).
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clients’ breaches makes sense in the context of closely-held
businesses because of the problems in distinguishing oppression
from legitimate business purposes; however, eliminating the
minority owner’s ability to pursue an action against the majority
owner’s lawyer for aiding and abetting a squeeze-out eliminates the
liability disincentive of lawyers in orchestrating squeeze-outs.
Therefore, a rule is needed to impose liability on lawyers who
knowingly assists their clients’ squeeze-outs and to prevent
innocent lawyers from being drawn into litigation by minority
owners’ allegations of oppression.
A rule neither over-inclusive nor under-inclusive hinges on the
knowledge element of aiding and abetting. A minority owner suing
a lawyer for aiding and abetting oppression must establish that the
lawyer had knowledge of the majority owner’s oppression. The
lawyer’s knowledge of oppression necessitates the lawyer’s
knowledge of the minority owner’s reasonable expectations. As
shown above, reasonable minds may differ as to what a minority
owner’s reasonable expectations are and to what extent the
majority owner treaded upon those reasonable expectations in
pursuing a business decision.
The ideal rule resolves the
ambiguities of a minority owner’s reasonable expectations before
an innocent lawyer becomes entrapped in litigation.
Three main issues arise in establishing a lawyer’s knowledge
for the purpose of aiding and abetting liability. The first issue is
the requisite standard of knowledge that lawyers facing liability
272
must possess.
The second issue is the type of circumstantial
evidence a plaintiff must bring forth to show that a lawyer had
273
actual knowledge. The third issue is whether there should be any
procedural barriers to a plaintiff alleging aiding and abetting
274
oppression.
1.

Standard of Knowledge

Standards of knowledge lie on a continuum. On one end is
constructive knowledge, the “knew or should have known”
272. See id. at 188(discussing the use of constructive knowledge and actual
knowledge in the context of professional liability for aiding and abetting).
273. See, e.g., Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788, 791–92 (Or. 1999) (stating
that a well-pleaded claim of a lawyer’s assistance was sufficient to reverse lower
court’s dismissal of claim against lawyer).
274. See, e.g., Berg & Berg Enters. v. Sherwood Partners, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 325,
339–40 (Ct. App. 2005).
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standard, and at the other end is actual knowledge. In aiding and
abetting liability, the standard of knowledge required often reflects
the policy objectives that are being pursued. For example, in
275
Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, the Second Circuit stated
that constructive knowledge sufficed to hold the defendant liable
for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty in the context of
276
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).
The court stated that a trustee of a pension fund’s cursory
investigation would have uncovered that the general contractor was
not making required contributions to the pension fund, in
277
In using this lower standard of
violation of fiduciary duty.
knowledge, which essentially imposed the duty to investigate upon
the trustee, the court was upholding policies with regard to the
278
thoroughness and application of ERISA.
Though it may have its place in protecting pension plans
overseen by the federal government, constructive knowledge
should not carry over to squeeze-outs. When the standard of
knowledge is “should-have-known,” lawyers would be required to
investigate suspicious activity. Imposing a duty to investigate
implies that the lawyer owes some heightened duty to the minority
owner. The duty to investigate would unduly hamper the effective
representation of lawyers because it would upset the trust and
confidence between the lawyer and her client. Moreover, it is not
279
the lawyer’s role to question the policy decisions of her clients,
and with the “should-have-known standard,” the lawyer will be
inclined to make these inquiries out of fear for personal liability.
In the context of lawyer liability, some courts use the
constructive knowledge standard loosely without considering the
impact that the standard of knowledge would have on lawyers. For
280
example, in Chem-Age Industries, Inc. v. Glover, the court reviewed
275. 974 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1992).
276. Id. at 283.
277. Id. (“Although the extent of the duty of inquiry may not be the same in all
circumstances, there is no doubt that here even a cursory investigation would have
uncovered [primary actor’s] breach.”).
278. Id.
279. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 3. (1983). Rule 1.13
addresses the lawyer’s role when representing a corporation; however, the
limitation of the lawyer’s representation relating to “[d]ecisions concerning policy
and operations, including ones entailing serious risk” that are not in the lawyer’s
province should be emphasized. Id. Second-guessing the client is different than
advising the client.
280. 652 N.W.2d 756 (S.D. 2002).
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an appeal of summary judgment that involved alleged lawyer
281
misconduct in a closely-held business. In Chem-Age, the founding
co-owner’s lawyer assisted him in making a number of
misrepresentations to the other co-owners regarding their interest
282
These misrepresentations led to the co-owners
in the business.
pursuing the lawyer in a suit involving a number of different claims,
including breach of fiduciary duty, malpractice, fraud, conversion,
283
and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty. In denying the
plaintiffs recovery on their breach of fiduciary duty and malpractice
actions, the court was steadfast in the importance of maintaining
284
the lawyer-client relationship.
The court then turned to the Restatement to determine
whether the lawyer could be held liable for the co-owner’s
285
actions.
In its analysis, the court cautioned that “[h]olding
attorneys liable for aiding and abetting the breach of a fiduciary
duty in rendering professional services poses both a hazard and a
quandary for the legal profession . . . . [O]verbroad liability might
diminish the quality of legal services, since it would impose ‘self
286
protective reservations’ in the attorney-client relationship.”
Interestingly, despite the court’s emphasis on preventing overly
broad liability, the court stated constructive knowledge would
suffice in some cases to impose liability on a lawyer for aiding and

281. Id. at 769 (noting the increase “in case law and professional literature on
attorney liability to third parties.”). In Chem-Age, the founding co-owner (Dahl)
induced two businessmen, Shepard and Peterson, to invest in Chem-Age by
misrepresenting to them that in return for their investment, they would be equity
owners of Chem-Age. Id. at 761–63. Dahl’s attorney, Glover, who had represented
Dahl in previous engagements acted as the corporation’s attorney. Id. Glover
prepared the paperwork listing Shepard and Peterson as incorporators and Glover
as registered agent. Id. Over time, Dahl began to use Chem-Age’s credit for
personal expenses, including personal gifts to Glover. Id. After calling a meeting
to address Dahl’s suspicious spending habits, Shepard and Peterson learned that
Dahl and Glover were in the process of selling Chem-Age’s assets. Id. In addition,
despite the papers that Glover seemingly filed with the Secretary of State, the two
businessmen learned that they had no ownership interest in Chem-Age. Id.
282. Id. at 761–62.
283. Id. at 761.
284. See id. at 769–71 (listing several reasons why the court is reluctant to relax
rule of privity in cases involving third party malpractice claims against lawyers).
285. “For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of
another, one is subject to liability if he . . . knows that the other’s conduct
constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to
the other so to conduct himself . . . .” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b)
(1979).
286. Chem-Age, 652 N.W.2d at 774.
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abetting, but that the use of constructive knowledge should be
limited to contexts in which the lawyer-client relationship was of
287
long duration.
The court’s suggestion that constructive knowledge is an
available standard contradicts the court’s policy that lawyer liability
should be limited.
Leaving the door open to constructive
knowledge as a standard for lawyer liability for aiding and abetting
in closely-held businesses leaves lawyers open to liability. The use
of constructive knowledge as the standard for aiding and abetting
falls short of providing adequate safeguards against lawyers. It is
inappropriate in light of the policies against aiding and abetting
288
having an over-inclusive effect.
To provide primary actors more protection than the
constructive knowledge standard allows, some courts have turned
289
to recklessness as a standard of knowledge.
A court using
recklessness as the standard of knowledge will find knowledge
where the conduct indicates a reckless disregard of the
consequences of an action or where there is highly unreasonable
conduct involving an extreme departure from ordinary care in a
290
Courts rarely
situation where a high degree of danger present.
spend a significant time evaluating which standard of knowledge to
use in reviewing a lawyer’s liability for aiding and abetting;
291
however, the court in Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Barness stated
that in some contexts, specifically securities, where transactions are
highly regulated, the underlying violations that give rise to aiding
and abetting liability are clearer cut and a lower standard of
292
knowledge suffices.
In contrast to securities cases, the inter se
287. Id. at 775.
288. Compare Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, 974 F.2d 270, 283 (2nd.
Cir. 1992) (analyzing aiding and abetting in the trust context) with Chem-Age
Industries v. Glover, 652 N.W.2d 756, 774 (S.D. 2002) (delineating the policies
against over-inclusive liability to lawyers).
289. See Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 459–60 (8th Cir. 1991).
290. See, e.g., Bolmer v. McKulsky, 812 A.2d 869, 872 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
To establish the defendant’s recklessness, the plaintiff has to prove that
on the part of the defendants, the existence of a state of consciousness
with reference to the consequences of one's acts. . . . [Such conduct] is
more than negligence, more than gross negligence. . . . [I]n order to
infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a
reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take
reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them . . . .
Id.
291. 611 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
292. Id. at 1027 n.37.
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obligations of co-owners in closely-held businesses are not highly
regulated.
When the violation is evident, such as a “plain vanilla” breach
of fiduciary duty, it may be appropriate to impose liability under a
293
But in the closely-held business
lesser standard of knowledge.
context where oppression is not evident, a recklessness standard of
knowledge does not resolve the problem of determining whether a
lawyer had knowledge of the minority owner’s reasonable
expectations. Oppression involves an underlying breach that is
contingent upon a reviewing court’s analysis of the fiduciary
relationship, so a higher level of knowledge is necessary to prevent
a lawyer from being vulnerable to minority owner attacks.
In criminal law, the doctrine of conscious avoidance has been
294
used as an alternative standard to actual knowledge.
A higher
standard than recklessness, the doctrine provides that although the
defendant may not have possessed actual knowledge, the
defendant’s lack of knowledge was due to affirmative acts on her
295
part to avoid discovery of the alleged wrongdoing.
In criminal
conspiracy cases, conscious avoidance may be used to prove that
the defendant had knowledge of the “unlawful aims and objectives
of the scheme” if “the evidence is such that a rational juror may
reach [the] conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that [the
defendant] was aware of a high probability [of the fact in dispute]
296
and consciously avoided confirming that fact.”

293. Id. In securities cases, the concern is “typically with the relative degree of
involvement of peripheral parties (i.e., brokers, banks, accountants) to the fraud,
not the ambiguous nature of the fraud itself.” Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 459–
60 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that in securities cases “[r]ecklessness satisfies the
knowledge requirement where the defendant owes a duty of disclosure to the
plaintiff” and that “[p]roof of a defendant’s knowledge or intent will often be
inferential and cases thus of necessity cast in terms of recklessness.”).
294. See United States v. Kaplan, 490 F.3d 110, 127 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[A jury]
instruction on conscious avoidance is proper only ‘(i) when a defendant asserts
the lack of some specific aspect of knowledge required for conviction and (ii) the
appropriate factual predicate for the charge exists.”) (quoting United States v.
Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 181 (2d Cir. 2006)).
295. Elkan Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer, Conscious Avoidance: A Substitute for
Actual Knowledge?, N.Y. L. J., May 1, 2007, at 3.
296. United States. v. Ferrarini, 219 F.3d 145, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting
United States v. Rodriguez, 983 F.2d 455, 458 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that
conscious avoidance instruction was harmless error because jury was also
instructed on actual knowledge and evidence supported a finding of defendant’s
actual knowledge of conspiracy to commit fraud).
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Although distinguishing between conscious avoidance and
actual knowledge may be necessary in criminal law, where a
defendant is at risk of incarceration and other harsh penalties, this
distinction would not play as pivotal a role if applied to civil aiding
297
The burden of proof to impose civil aiding and
and abetting.
abetting liability is lower than the burden of proof needed to
298
impose criminal liability.
To impose criminal liability, the
evidence must be such that jurors are certain beyond a reasonable
299
doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime.
But in the
context of civil aiding and abetting, only the greater weight of the
evidence is required for the trier of fact to decide that the
300
In the context of aiding and abetting
defendant is liable.
squeeze-outs, evidence that shows that a lawyer was aware of a high
probability that her client’s motive was to oppress the minority
owner, but continued to assist the client anyway, may be sufficiently
convincing to establish actual knowledge by a preponderance of
301
Actual knowledge is the correct standard to apply
the evidence.
in lawyer aiding and abetting cases because requiring the minority
owner to prove actual knowledge does not foreclose the minority
owner’s opportunity to bring forth meritorious claims and because
the lawyer-client relationship should be protected.
2.

Proving Actual Knowledge

At first glance, meeting the burden of proving actual
Ideally, actual knowledge is
knowledge appears impossible.
established by direct evidence, where the lawyer makes an
admission of wrongdoing or where the lawyer drafts documents
302
that include blatant misrepresentations. It is rare that the lawyer

297. See id. (stating that evidence that supports finding that defendant had
actual knowledge does necessarily support finding that defendant willfully avoided
a fact).
298. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (stating that
burden of proof in civil matters is typically preponderance-of-the-evidence).
299. See, e.g., Ferrarini, 219 F.3d at 154.
300. See, e.g., Addington, 441 U.S. at 424.
301. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. A high probability of client
misconduct should be distinguished from mere “red flags,” as lawyers should not
be required to investigate their client’s motives. Id.
302. For example, when a lawyer drafts and sends letters to a plaintiff
containing false information regarding the legal effectiveness of the majority
owner’s previous attempts to remove the plaintiff from the business, direct
evidence may be found. Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788, 791 (Or. 1999).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008

55

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 1
6. EID - ADC

4/23/2008 7:40:03 PM

1232

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:3

mentions to another that she not only knew of her client’s breach
of fiduciary duty but that she substantially assisted her client in
303
furtherance of that breach.
For actual knowledge not to be a
complete barrier to aiding and abetting claims, it must be possible
304
to prove actual knowledge through circumstantial evidence.
The issue then becomes the quantity and quality of
circumstantial evidence needed to impose liability onto a lawyer.
Circumstantial evidence must amount to more than creating an
inference that the lawyer should have known of her client’s
unlawful conduct or that the lawyer was reckless in providing
assistance in ousting a minority owner in a business where
relationships among co-owners are volatile. In situations where
there is an absence of misrepresentations or violations of the law, a
lawyer’s claim that she was acting in furtherance of a client’s
305
legitimate business purpose should be given great weight.
a.

Assessing knowledge and substantial assistance in tandem

Establishing that the lawyer had actual knowledge requires a

303. See, e.g., id. at 791–92 (analyzing lawyer’s assistance to determine whether
plaintiff stated a valid claim against lawyers); Thornwood, Inc. v. Jenner & Block,
799 N.E.2d 756, 768–69 (Ill. Ct. App. 2003) (reviewing lawyer’s actions to
determine whether to dismiss complaint).
304. See McNulty & Hanson, supra note 49, at 43. In analyzing the requirement
of actual knowledge, plaintiffs may prove the defendant had knowledge by
circumstantial evidence, usually through a series of “red flags” that leads one to
ask how the defendant could not have seen them along the way; however, “[t]here
is a danger in such a must-have-known analysis . . . the secondary actor's alleged
awareness of the fraud is subjected to the scalpel of the legal dissector, not from
the vantage of foresight, but from the perspective of omniscient hindsight.” Id. at
43–44.
305. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The
“McDonnell Douglas” test is used in employment discrimination cases to
determine whether an employee has been wrongfully discriminated against.
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima
facie case of employment discrimination. Id. at 802. The defendant employer
must then present a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its decision. Id. If
the defendant offers such a reason, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the
defendant employer’s “legitimate” reasons were not the result of improper
pretext. Id. at 804. Shifting the burden to the plaintiff to prove that the legitimate
business purpose was pretextual has received criticism as it is incredibly difficult to
do. See Joe Keith Windle, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks: Is the Supreme Court’s
Definition of Pretext Beneficial or Detrimental to Title VII Plaintiffs?, 18 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 213, 226–27 (1994) (delineating the difficulties plaintiffs face in prevailing
in employment discrimination actions). The burden-shifting results in the court
giving deference to the legitimate business decisions of employers. See id.
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factual inquiry in addition to the initial factual inquiry that resulted
in a finding of oppression.
The quality and quantity of
circumstantial evidence that is sufficient to give rise to a finding of
actual knowledge must be such that the fact-finder can be sure that
306
Because both
the lawyer knew about the client’s breach.
oppression and the lawyer-client relationship are so fact specific, a
court’s analysis of a lawyer’s actual knowledge of oppression in one
case will not be applicable to another case. As previously discussed,
comment (d) to the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876(b)
allows the decision maker to use various factors in evaluating
whether the lawyer substantially assisted her client in breaching a
307
fiduciary duty.
These same factors provide guidance in finding
relevant evidence to show that the lawyer had actual knowledge.
Analyzing knowledge and substantial assistance in tandem is
308
not a novel approach; however, it has received some criticism.
The concern arises when courts require less assistance with the

306. In determining a lawyer’s liability for aiding and abetting, the plaintiff
must show by the preponderance of the evidence that the lawyer had actual
knowledge. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Slocum, Gordon & Co., 334 F. Supp. 2d 144, 187
(D.R.I. 2004) (stating that plaintiffs fail to establish security regulations violations,
including aiding and abetting violations, by a preponderance of the evidence).
Therefore, the weight of the evidence must be supportive of the fact-finder’s
conclusion. See, e.g., Northrup v. State, No. 14-06-00967-CR, 2007 WL 4442611, at
*1 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2007). The court in Northrup discussed factual
sufficiency:
In reviewing factual sufficiency, we view all the evidence in a neutral light
to determine whether (1) the evidence in support of the jury's verdict,
although legally sufficient, is nevertheless so weak that the jury's verdict
seems clearly wrong and unjust; and (2) in considering conflicting
evidence, the jury's verdict, although legally sufficient, is nevertheless
against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence . . . . We
consider all the evidence and we do not intrude upon the jury's role of
assigning credibility and weight to the evidence.
Id.
307. The factors include: 1) the nature of the act encouraged; 2) the amount
of assistance given by the defendant; 3) his presence or absence at the time of the
tort; 4) his relation to the fiduciary; 5) the defendant’s state of mind.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d (1979). A sixth factor, the
duration of assistance, originated in case law and is also included in this analysis.
Halberstram v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“The length of time an
alleged aider-abettor has been involved with a tortfeasor almost certainly affects
the quality and extent of their relationship and probably influences the amount of
aid provided as well; additionally, it may afford evidence of the defendant's state of
mind.”).
308. See Combs, supra note 14, at 274 (arguing that requiring less assistance
broadens the scope of liability to the aider and abettor).
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309

showing of more knowledge.
Such concern is justifiable, as it is
unclear why a greater showing of knowledge would lessen the
amount of assistance needed for liability to attach. Just as more
knowledge could substitute for less participation, the type and
310
In the
degree of participation may be evidence of knowledge.
aiding and abetting oppression context where the breach of
fiduciary duty is not obvious, a showing that by the very nature and
amount of the assistance the lawyer had to have known of the
underlying breach may be the only way to establish knowledge.
The lawyer’s conduct could reflect knowledge in many
situations. The length of the lawyer/client relationship or the
311
duration of assistance could be indicative of actual knowledge.
Oppression cases involve an entanglement of the minority owner’s
reasonable expectations and the majority owner’s legitimate
312
A long-time lawyer for the majority owner
business interests.
would have a difficult time asserting that she did not know of the
minority owner’s reasonable expectations; however, if a lawyer has
represented a majority owner for a few months, the lawyer’s client’s
attempt to oppress the minority owner may not be evident. In
relationships of short duration, a lawyer may not fully understand
the extent of the minority owner’s reasonable expectations. The
lawyer’s lack of exposure to the business diminishes her ability to
distinguish between a legitimate business and oppression,
especially if the client offers a legitimate (though false) business
purpose, such as the minority owner having a nervous breakdown,
313
to support his request.
A long-term relationship between a lawyer and a majority
owner is indicative of the lawyer being closely involved in the
business; but duration alone does not conclusively show intimacy of

309. Id.
310. See Witzman v. Lehrman, Lerman & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179, 188 (Minn.
1999) (“Factors such as the relationship between the defendant and the primary
tortfeasor, the nature of the primary tortfeasor’s activity, the nature of the
assistance provided by the defendant, and the defendant’s state of mind all come
into play.”).
311. See id.
312. See, e.g., Pooley v. Mankator Iron & Metal, Inc., 513 N.W.2d 834 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1994); Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
313. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d at 801–2 (finding that majority owner’s conduct
including firing the minority owner, discontinuing the minority owner’s benefits,
and telling fellow employees that minority owner had a nervous breakdown, was a
breach of fiduciary duty).
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314

involvement.
The key question is whether the lawyer had
sufficient interaction with her client and the business in order to
315
detect oppression.
A lawyer who is deeply involved with the
affairs of the owners and knows that each owner has a desire to stay
in the business, most likely is aware of the owners’ reasonable
316
If it shown that the lawyer had extensive
expectations.
interaction with the owners and the company and the majority
owner’s purported legitimate business purpose involves a
misrepresentation. A lawyer’s excuse of not knowing will lack
317
merit. Hence, the lawyer’s conduct must be viewed in light of her
knowledge of the minority owner’s reasonable expectations so that
the lawyer who orchestrates a squeeze-out will not be able to
benefit from a blurred boundary between minority owner’s
reasonable expectations and the majority owner’s legitimate
business purposes.
The factor that is perhaps the most significant in a lawyer
318
aiding and abetting oppression analysis is the nature of the act.
As discussed above, lawyers are often necessary in oppression
because of the technical and strategic complexity involved in
319
320
For example, in Granewich v. Harding,
the
squeeze-outs.
lawyer’s use of overtly aggressive and complex techniques shows
how the lawyer’s assistance was necessary to the majority owner’s
321
objective of removing the minority owner from the business. The
level of sophistication of the assistance is sufficient to show that the
314. See Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stating that
the secondary actor’s relation to the primary tortfeasor is only one factor to
consider); see also Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 188 (stating that duration of assistance is
one factor that could lead to a court’s use of constructive knowledge as requisite
standard of knowledge).
315. See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 488 (stating that the amount of assistance
although not overwhelming “added up over time to an essential part of the
pattern”).
316. See supra Part III.B.3.c.
317. The scenario described in the text is based on Pedro v. Pedro, 489
N.W.2d 798 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), which held that majority owner’s actions in
ousting the minority owner, including misrepresenting that the minority owner
was incompetent, constituted a breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 802.
318. See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 484 (“[T]he nature of the act dictates what
aid might matter.”).
319. See Barksdale, supra note 38, at 577 (noting that lawyer liability in the
squeeze-out context “stems from the necessity of attorney involvement in that type
of transaction”).
320. 985 P.2d 788 (Or. 1999).
321. Id. at 791. The majority owners sought the assistance of the lawyer after
they had attempted to remove the minority owner themselves. Id.
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lawyer had to have known that the client was squeezing out the
322
minority owner.
Even if a lawyer has actual knowledge of her client’s breach of
fiduciary duty, a lawyer will not be liable for aiding and abetting her
client unless the lawyer provided substantial assistance to her client
in furtherance of that breach. In the context of professionals,
courts are careful not to impose liability on those who conduct
323
Among the policies that inspire
“routine professional services.”
courts to protect professionals from liability for performing routine
services is maintaining the trust in the professional-client
324
Additionally, a wide “liability net” might stifle the
relationship.
willingness of lawyers to represent majority owners in pursuing
legitimate business purposes. But when a lawyer is essential to
effectuating a complex squeeze-out, she is more than a scrivener.
The technical and strategic assistance that a lawyer provides
requires more than merely filling out forms for the client. It
requires expertise. Therefore, in the oppression context, a
squeeze-out that could only occur with the assistance of a lawyer
provides the best evidence for establishing not only actual
325
knowledge but substantial assistance.
322. For an example of the need for lawyers in oppression cases, see
Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield, 282 Cal. Rptr. 627 (Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that lawyer was not liable conspiring with client/majority owner in
breaching fiduciary duties owed to minority owner because lawyer did not owe
minority owner any fiduciary duties). In Skarbevik, the lawyer knew that the
majority of owners intended to dilute the minority owner’s interest in the business.
Id. at 631–32. The lawyer informed his clients that they needed a “legitimate
corporate purpose” before any amendment to the by-laws, which would be
detrimental to the minority. owner, could be made. Id. at 631. The lawyer
proceeded to draft documents containing misrepresentations in order to oppress
the minority owner. Id. at 632.
323. See Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman, & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179, 189 (Minn.
1999) (“‘[S]ubstantial assistance’ means something more than providing routine
professional services.”). Although Witzman involves an aiding and abetting claim
against an accountant, it is analogous to contexts in which professionals are
providing routine services.
324. Id. at 186 (“If professionals have reason to believe that they may be held
liable for their clients' torts merely by providing routine professional services to
their clients, the professionals may face a conflict between serving their clients and
protecting their own interests.”).
325. See Hefferman v. Bass, 467 F.3d 596, 598–99 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding the
facts in the plaintiff/co-owner’s complaint against lawyer, including the lawyer
drafting an unfair buyout agreement and release, formatting it in such a way as to
look like another document, and then giving it to the client/owner in the middle
of the night knowing that the client is going to the co-owner’s home to trick the
co-owner into handing over his interest in the business, were sufficient to allege
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Procedural Barriers

For the court to find actual knowledge, it must determine
whether a squeeze-out is the result of a technically and strategically
savvy scheme that is so connected with obvious misconduct so as to
326
A layperson does not have the
imply the lawyer’s knowledge.
knowledge and experience to be able to determine the point at
which evidence submitted by the plaintiff establishes the lawyer’s
327
Just as a co-owner
actual knowledge of her client’s oppression.
needs the assistance of a lawyer to effect a squeeze-out, a factfinder’s ability to determine the lawyer’s actual knowledge requires
328
an expert. Existing procedures for determining legal malpractice
liability provide a way to supplement the fact-finder’s ability in
reviewing the evidence.
In Minnesota, to bring a claim against a lawyer for malpractice,
329
the plaintiff must comply with Minnesota Statutes section 544.42.
Section 544.42, subdivision 2 requires a plaintiff who plans on
using expert testimony to establish a prima facie case and to submit
with the pleadings an affidavit that states that the allegations have
been reviewed by the plaintiff’s lawyer with the assistance an
330
expert.
The initial affidavit must include the lawyer’s statement
that an expert “whose qualifications provide reasonable
expectation that the expert’s opinions could be admissible at trial
and that, in the opinion of the expert, the defendant deviated from
331
In addition to this initial
the applicable standard of care.”
affidavit, within 180 days of commencing the action, the plaintiff
must provide the defendant with an expert disclosure that:

substantial assistance and knowledge in an aiding and abetting claim against the
lawyer).
326. See supra Part III.B.3.b.
327. See Barksdale, supra note 38, at 577 (“Attorneys routinely facilitate
corporate squeeze-outs because the close corporation is a legal entity whose very
existence derives from attorney input and whose rules of governance and
procedures are not easily understood by lay persons.”).
328. See supra Part III.B.3.c.
329. See Charles E. Lundberg, Legal Malpractice: Techniques to Avoid Liability
1999, 608 PLI/LIT 357, 361 (1999) (stating that “[i]n all but the most obvious
situations, a legal malpractice plaintiff must establish the applicable standard of
care, and the defendant’s breach of that standard, through a competent witness—
an attorney who has practical experience in the subject matter” and that section
544.42 now requires the same type of expert review for legal malpractice actions as
is required in medical malpractice actions).
330. Id.
331. MINN. STAT. § 544.42, subdiv. 2 (2006).
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(1) identifies each person the attorney expects to call as
an expert; (2) describes the expert’s opinion on the
applicable standard of care, as recognized by the
professional community; (3) explains the expert’s opinion
that the defendant departed from that standard; and (4)
summarizes the expert’s opinion that the defendant’s
332
departure was a direct cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.
The minimum standard in fulfilling the affidavit requirement is to
provide the parties and the court with meaningful information with
respect to the issues on which the expert will be testifying so as to
333
avoid a directed verdict.
Section 544.42 was enacted ostensibly for the purpose of
334
In malpractice
limiting frivolous claims against professionals.
claims, the expert’s testimony has the dual effect of filtering out
frivolous claims against the lawyer and of adding legitimacy to the
plaintiff’s claim. The requirement of a lawyer’s testimony weeds
out unmeritorious claims by ensuring that the lawyer’s conduct is
measured against an objective standard of reasonableness in the
335
Furthermore, expert review limits frivolous
legal profession.
claims by forcing lawyers who testify on the issue of another
lawyer’s conduct to “put her name on the line.” The risk of
disparaging one’s professional reputation discourages a lawyer
from being an expert for a plaintiff pursuing a bogus claim.
The objectives behind requiring expert testimony in legal
malpractice actions are equally present in aiding and abetting
fiduciary duty actions against lawyers. Lawyers who assist majority
owners in pursuing legitimate business purposes risk being sued by
336
Accordingly, a law
minority owners claiming oppression.
requiring an expert affidavit and testimony in aiding and abetting
actions against lawyers is appropriate. Unlike in a legal malpractice

332. Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732 N.W.2d 209, 219 (Minn.
2007) (analyzing section 544.42’s command for sufficient information in expert
affidavits in accountant malpractice claim).
333. See id. (holding that the expert’s affidavit, which included a detailed
description of the factual application drawing certain legal conclusions, was
deficient because the affidavit did not identify any standard of care, state how the
professional deviated from the applicable standard of care, and show how the
deviation caused plaintiff’s injury).
334. Id. at 217.
335. See Noske v. Friedberg, 713 N.W.2d 866, 874 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006)
(stating that malpractice does not apply to a “claim based on a lawyer’s failure to
pursue a particular strategy.”).
336. See supra Part I.
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action, however, where the issue is whether the lawyer was
negligent, the issue in an aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary
duty action is whether the lawyer had actual knowledge of her
client’s oppressive scheme and whether she substantially assisted
337
her client. Therefore, in an aiding and abetting action, the focus
of the expert’s testimony would be something different than the
applicable standard of care.
In determining the substance of the expert’s testimony, one
must be wary of evidence that would be unduly prejudicial to the
338
lawyer and would consequently be inadmissible.
In general,
expert witnesses are barred from making conclusory statements
339
about a defendant’s knowledge or intent.
Instead of the
defendant/lawyer’s actual knowledge being the focus of the
expert’s affidavit, the testimony must concentrate on the actual
squeeze-out.
As discussed above, in the aiding and abetting squeeze-out
context, the crux of the actual knowledge and substantial assistance
inquiries is the existence of a strategically or technically complex
squeeze-out. The expert must use the facts including the business’s
charter and bylaws (which may allude to the minority owner’s
reasonable expectations), the documents, the transactions, the
availability of alternative decisions that would have protected the
minority owner’s reasonable expectations, and any other relevant
information to analyze the squeeze-out objectively.
After

337. See Anstine v. Alexander, 128 P.3d 249, 255 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
A cause of action for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty
requires (1) breach by a fiduciary of a duty owed to a plaintiff, (2) a
defendant’s knowing participation in the breach, and (3) damages. A
claim for legal malpractice requires proof of damages incurred by the
plaintiff client and caused by the negligence of an attorney who owes a
duty of care to the client.
Id.
338. FED. R. EVID. 403, 704.
339. See, e.g., State v. Richardson, 525 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994)
(stating that expert testimony of defendant’s mental history was admissible to
prove defendant’s state of mind, but that expert may not make conclusions about
a defendant’s “actual beliefs at time of offense, about the reasonableness of those
beliefs, or about [defendant's] state of mind before, during and after the criminal
act”). Additionally, certain actions against lawyers involving intentional conduct
such as intentional misrepresentation , breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud do not
require expert witnesses. See Smith v. Morris, Manning & Martin, LLP, 589 S.E.2d
840, 844 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (stating that statute requiring expert affidavit applies
only to claims alleging professional negligence, not claims based on intentional
conduct).
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examining the mechanisms and level of complexity existent in the
squeeze-out, the expert may opine as to whether the squeeze-out
was so complex that only a lawyer could have orchestrated it.
This approach is not novel as it has been used in criminal law
340
for establishing a person’s connection with a gang. For example,
in People v. Garcia, the court distinguished an expert’s testimony
regarding the “culture, habits, and psychology of gangs” from
testimony of a defendant’s specific intent or knowledge because the
former are merely probative and are subjects “sufficiently beyond
common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the
341
trier of fact.” In Garcia, the defendant’s particularized knowledge
of the gang’s activities evidenced his affiliation. Similarly, the
expert’s affidavit characterizes the squeeze-out as an act that only a
select few have the skill to do.
A rule that requires an expert affidavit in aiding and abetting
breach of fiduciary duty actions against lawyers equips courts with
the expertise necessary to decide complex cases. The rule is not
under-inclusive; it protects and encourages the trust and honesty
existent in fiduciary relationships among co-owners. If a majority
owner establishes a prima facie case of aiding and abetting breach
of fiduciary duty with an affidavit combined with a well-pleaded
342
complaint, litigation continues. The rule imposes on lawyers the
liability-related disincentive to give necessary assistance in squeezeouts and prevents lawyers from being necessary handmaidens to
their clients’ breaches of fiduciary duties. The rule is not overinclusive; it safeguards the lawyer-client relationship and prevents
frivolous minority claims against lawyers. The affidavit is a
sufficient barrier to unmeritorious claims. As lawyers have no more

340. See, e.g., People v. Garcia, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 104, 107 (Ct. App. 2007).
We publish this case because we hold that evidence of actual knowledge
of a criminal street gang’s current activities, including information about
where gang members had hidden gang guns and the identity of members
who were engaged in gang shootings, when an expert testifies such
information is available only to other active gang members, satisfies the
statutory requirement of active participation in a gang.
Id.
341. Id. at 114.
342. Other probative factors that may be used to establish actual knowledge
such as the duration of the lawyer’s assistance would most likely stay in the
plaintiff’s actual complaint. The duration of assistance and the particular
relationship that the lawyer had with the business and the co-owners lead to a
subjective inquiry into the lawyer’s actual knowledge and best left out of an
expert’s affidavit stating “objective” opinion.
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reason to fear an aiding and abetting claim than they do a
malpractice claim, the policies associated with imposing liability
onto lawyers for aiding and abetting squeeze-outs, including the
chilling effect on representation and the trust existent in the
lawyer-client relationship, are not in jeopardy.
V. CONCLUSION
Fiduciary duties are important tools to ensure that the
dominant party does not take advantage of the weaker party in a
343
Inter se fiduciary obligations are
confidential relationship.
fundamental to maintaining trust and confidence among co-owners
344
in closely-held businesses.
When co-owners enter into a
relationship, there are certain expectations that each owner has
345
that are fundamental to their participation in the business.
Safeguarding the duty of loyalty existent among owners in closelyheld businesses is necessary to protect minority owners from being
oppressed by their stronger counterparts. A continuation of this
proposition is that lawyers who aid and abet their clients in
oppression should be liable for aiding and abetting breach of
346
fiduciary duty.
Reasonable expectations can be ambiguous, so subjecting
lawyers to liability for aiding and abetting oppression could result
in lawyers second guessing their clients’ motives and objectives in
347
making decisions in closely-held businesses.
The fiduciary
relationships among co-owners should not jeopardize the trust and
confidence between a lawyer and her client. In addition, lawyers
could be forced into years of protracted litigation by disgruntled
minority owners bringing forth frivolous suits. To protect the
lawyer-client relationship and to prevent innocent lawyers from
being drawn into litigation, liability should be restricted to cases in
which it is clear that the lawyer knowingly assisted her client in
oppressing a minority owner.
Preventing aiding and abetting liability from having an overinclusive effect requires a strong showing that a lawyer knowingly
and substantially assisted a majority owner’s breach of fiduciary

343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

See supra Part III.A.1.
See supra Part III.A.2.
See id.
See supra Part III.B.3.c.
See supra Part IV.A.1.
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348

duty. Where there is a lack of direct evidence revealing a lawyer’s
liability in the squeeze-out, a minority owner may present certain
circumstantial evidence, such as an expert witness, that implicates
the lawyer’s involvement in the squeeze-out. A threshold finding
that a squeeze-out was structured and carried out in such a way that
a lawyer had to have been involved strikes a necessary balance
between a lawyer’s interest in providing advice and assistance to her
client and a minority owner’s reasonable expectations.

348.

See supra Part IV.B.
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